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ABSTRACT 
SCHOOL QUALITY, HOUSE PRICES, AND LIQUIDITY: THE 
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM IN BATON ROUGE 
By 
VELMA ZAHIROVIC-HERBERT 
May 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Geoffrey K. Turnbull 
Major Department: Economics 
 
After a court imposed desegregation plan ended in 1996, the Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
school district created neighborhood attendance zones for its schools, followed by a series of 
attendance zone changes. We use data from 1994 to 2002 to examine the impact of changes in 
school characteristics on simultaneous determination of house prices and liquidity in the market. 
A simultaneous equations model of sales price and tine-on-market is adopted that extends the 
hedonic price model by controlling for localized neighborhood market conditions. Our empirical 
results show that improving and declining school performance can have asymmetric 
capitalization effects. Further, as indicated by the search-market model, liquidity absorbs part of 
the capitalization of school quality; for example, declining school performance prolongs houses’ 
marketing time. 
1 
Chapter 1: School Quality, House Prices, and Liquidity—The Effects of Public School 
Reform in Baton Rouge 
A house is typically a person's largest asset, and the quality of local public schools is 
often a major consideration when a family with school-age children looks for a house to buy.  To 
attract potential house buyers, real estate agents prominently feature which school district a 
house is in along with other characteristics such as the features of the house and proximity to 
parks, shopping, etc.  Since information on schools is readily available to the public, house 
buyers can easily include school quality in their assessment of a house’s value.  With so much 
importance given toward housing and public schools, any relationship between them merits 
investigation. 
 This dissertation uses data from East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, from 1994 through 
2002 to study the relationship between property values and school performance and school racial 
composition.  While numerous studies look at house buyers’ valuations of school quality, there 
has been little emphasis on which measures of school quality they consider when making choices 
about where they live and how that affects their children’s education.  In addition, this research 
investigates the impact of school performance and school racial composition on liquidity.   
Liquidity is a property of an asset that reflects how long traders must wait in order to 
trade at market prices.  Most theories of asset pricing, based on modeling financial assets, 
assume that assets are perfectly liquid since buyers and sellers are matched instantaneously.  
However, the matching process between buyers and sellers can be quite slow in the residential 
housing market.  By taking into account the interrelationship between selling prices and time-on-
market, this dissertation provides a more complete analysis of the impact of changes in school 
characteristics on the housing market than previous research offers.  
2 
Many studies have examined property values in order to assess the value people place on 
the quality of local public services and property taxes.1 Most of the studies that are concerned 
with school quality use the data on housing sales transactions and regress them on a measure of 
school quality.  Studies such as Haurin and Brasington (1996), Hayes and Taylor (1996), and 
Black (1999) measure school quality through standardized test scores.  Using cross-sectional 
analysis, they show a positive relationship between test scores and housing prices.   
Yet, in addition to test scores, parents care about the peer effects and the environment in 
which their children are learning (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2002; Hoxby, 2000).  A school 
environment can be characterized by factors that include socio-economic and demographic 
composition of the student body.  While Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), and Hoxby (2000) 
examine peer effects and their relation to school performance, few recent studies consider direct 
student peer effects as measured by the socio-economic characteristics of the students in the 
school and their impact on house values.  For example, Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) use the 
percent of an elementary school’s student body that receives reduced-price lunch to show that 
excluding this factor substantially increase the coefficients for elementary test scores.  A more 
recent study by Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2005) finds strong evidence that the percentage of 
Hispanic students and the percentage of free lunch students have significant long-run negative 
effects on house values. 
The hedonic price model and conventional capitalization theory suggest that the value of 
the characteristics of a house is fully capitalized into the house price.  In the short run, the supply 
of owner occupied housing is fixed and the market response to demand shocks should be 
                                                 
1 Ross and Yinger (1999) provide a review of the empirical literature on the capitalization of public service quality 
and property taxes into house prices. 
 
3 
symmetric: positive shocks resulting in price increases and negative shocks resulting in price 
decreases.  However, these markets typically respond to large negative demand shocks with long 
periods during which asset liquidity declines but house prices change relatively little.2  A few 
studies examine the impact of locational amenities on selling time.3  It is well recognized that 
there is a tradeoff between an acceptable price and the time a seller has a house on the market 
(Belkin, Hempel, & McLeavey, 1976; Haurin, 1988).  Nevertheless, previous housing market 
studies examine locational amenities’ impact either on property values or on selling time.  The 
simultaneous determination of sales price and time-on-market is overlooked in estimating the 
benefits of locational amenities.  Failure to account for the simultaneity of the time-price 
relationship can result in biased estimates of different attributes that affect house prices.  
In sum, the impact of public policies that alter locational amenities such as neighborhood 
school quality needs to be examined through not only sales prices but also the liquidity of the 
housing market.   
Several events make East Baton Rouge Parish an ideal place to study the effect of school 
test scores and school racial composition on housing prices and time-on-market.  First, under a 
court-imposed desegregation plan in place from 1981 through 1996, the district imposed random 
school assignments, which resulted in mandatory busing for its students. In an effort to achieve 
racial balance, formerly white and formerly black schools were paired or clustered, and students 
were bused to their clusters based on the need to create racial balance.  These kinds of 
desegregation orders created strong public resistance and a migration of white students from the 
public school system.  Finally, 15 years after court-ordered random school assignments started, 
                                                 
2 Stein (1995) and Genesove and Mayer (1997) explain the decline in asset liquidity that follows a negative demand 
shock by sellers being equity constrained. 
3 Nelson (1982) reviews studies that look into impact of highway noise on property values and selling time. 
4 
the district adopted a plan that eliminated random school assignment in favor of “community 
sensitive” attendance zones, which were drawn to maximize a sense of community and 
ownership of the schools.4 The move to community sensitive attendance zones implies that the 
school attended by the student is strictly determined by residence location.  For the period of 
random school assignments, school quality cannot be considered a locational amenity, yet when 
school attendance is determined by residence location, we can include school quality as one of 
the measures of locational amenities.  
Second, because the district tried to promote racial desegregation, it implemented a series 
of attendance zone changes that included different neighborhoods often segregated along racial 
lines.  Changes in attendance zones, or redistricting, affected the housing market in two ways.  
First, many houses were assigned to new schools, changing their locational attributes.  Second, 
even for those houses that had stable school assignments, changes in attendance zones 
boundaries in other neighborhoods led to large changes in the characteristics of the students 
assigned to their schools.  
It is often difficult to provide statistical evidence in the social sciences because most 
events are generated by actions that people undertake deliberately.  We argue that events that 
occurred in East Baton Rouge Parish provide a rare opportunity to study how a sudden 
exogenous change in public policy impacts the housing market.  The changes in school 
assignments implemented by East Baton Rouge Parish School System are a natural experiment 
in education policy.  The school district was operating under a court-imposed desegregation 
order.  This desegregation order caused changes in the housing market locational amenities in the 
form of test scores and school demographic composition.  Such exogenous change allows us to 
                                                 
4 Consent Decree, page 2. 
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use classical statistical theory that works only if variations in data occur randomly.  The 
uniqueness of our data set and empirical methodology avoid common difficulties in housing 
market studies.  While looking within one school district enables us to eliminate variations in 
property tax rates, school spending, and other public services, two different sources of variation 
along boundaries of school attendance zones and following the change in school assignments 
provide for an ideal situation to study the effects of school quality measures and racial 
composition on housing prices.  Similarly, controls for the localized housing market supply and 
demand conditions ensure that price and time-on-market equations are identified in the 2SLS 
estimation, and remove a potential source of spatial correlation in housing data.  
 This dissertation uses a unique data set to provide the first empirical study that considers 
the impact of changes in school quality on simultaneous determination of selling price and time-
on-market in an empirical environment that controls for the neighborhood supply and demand 
conditions.  By taking into account the interrelationship between prices and time-on-market, this 
dissertation provides a complete estimate of the impact of changes in school characteristics on 
housing market.  The dissertation offers empirical evidence relevant to answering the following 
questions.  What is a good school worth? Which school characteristics do parents find most 
important when examining school quality?  How is the housing market affected by public policy 
that changes school quality?  How does a change in school quality impact both components of 
the housing market: selling price and liquidity?   
The dissertation is organized as follows; Chapter 2 presents the background information 
on the history of school desegregation in East Baton Rouge Parish.  Its main focus is the events 
that took place after the end of court-ordered mandatory busing and their impact on school racial 
composition. 
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Chapter 3 is concerned with the capitalization of different measures of school quality.  Its 
purpose is to evaluate the effect of the end of court ordered school desegregation on housing 
prices using traditional hedonic price models.  First, it presents the review of literature that 
examines capitalization of public services in owner occupied houses.  Second, it lays out the 
theoretical framework and model that relaxes the assumption of a vertical supply curve for the 
stock of housing.  This is an essential assumption for the bid rent model adopted here and in 
previous studies as the basis for estimation.  In the section that reviews the data and methodology 
implemented, we discuss the importance of adequately measuring the quality of the 
neighborhood and school, and separating those two effects.  We estimate different specifications 
of hedonic price models and use Black’s (1999) approach focusing on differences in housing 
price effects near attendance zone boundaries. In focusing on school boundaries, we assume that 
unobserved factors affecting house prices are not systematically correlated with school test 
scores across the boundaries themselves.  However, residential choice models imply that there 
would be considerable sorting along these stable school boundaries.5 For example, families who 
are willing to pay more to live in a school attendance area with better schools may be better 
educated and have higher income.  Even if houses and neighborhoods are very similar on either 
side of a school attendance boundary when the boundary is initially established, the resemblance 
may not last long as properties are traded in the market.  To the extent that this sorting occurs, it 
biases boundary estimates toward finding a positive relationship between school quality and 
property value.  Nevertheless, the uniqueness of our data allows us to focus on the time period 
                                                 
5Using an equilibrium model of residential sorting, Bayer, Fferreria, and McMillian (2004) provides clear evidence 
that the full effect of school quality on residential sorting is significantly larger than the direct effect -- four times as 
great for education stratification, twice for income stratification. This is due to a strong social multiplier associated 
with heterogeneous preferences for peers and neighbors; initial changes in school quality set in motion a process of 
re-sorting on the basis of neighborhood characteristics that reinforces itself, giving rise to substantially larger 
stratification effects 
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when the move to community-sensitive attendance zones is originally implemented and include 
school quality as one of the measures of locational attributes while controlling for the possibility 
of this type of residential sorting.  
Chapter 4 is concerned with the impact of a change in school quality on both components 
of the housing market: selling price and liquidity.  Its purpose is to account for a simultaneous 
determination of price and time-on-market.  First, the chapter presents a review of literature that 
examines the determinants of housing market liquidity.  Second, it lays out the theoretical 
framework and search-theoretic model where prices and time-on-market are derived from the 
maximizing behavior of both buyers and sellers.  We then follow with the discussion of data and 
the empirical methodology.  We adopt a simultaneous equations model of sales price and time-
on-market developed in Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) extending the hedonic price model used 
in Chapter Three by controlling for neighborhood market conditions.   
The final section of this dissertation, Chapter 5, offers concluding remarks based on 
findings in the two previous chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Background on Schools in East Baton Rouge Parish 
The East Baton Rouge Parish School System (EBRSS) serves the Greater Baton Rouge 
area.  It is the third largest district in the state and among the top 75 nationally in student 
enrollment.  The EBRSS comprises 88 schools with an enrollment of approximately 45,000 
students in pre-kindergarten through grade 12.  The EBRSS has gone through many changes 
because of its battle with school desegregation law suits.  Table 1 represents EBRSS’s 
desegregation timeline.  
The constitutionality of Baton Rouge’s de jure segregated school system was first 
challenged in 1956 in the case of Davis et al. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (78 F.3d 
920, 926, 5th Cir. 1956).  The first federal court order mandating school desegregation came in 
1960, but it did not include any specific timetable.  Baton Rouge schools continued to be 
segregated on a de facto basis throughout the 1970s (Baird & Luster, 1990).  In 1980, U.S. 
District Judge John Parker found that the school system had not done enough to create a racially 
integrated school system.  As a result, in 1981, Judge Parker was presented with different plans 
that tried a variety of strategies to ensure racial balancing.  For example, the district submitted a 
plan that called for the creation of more than 30 new magnet schools and centers of excellence to 
attract white students to predominantly black schools and vice versa.  The Justice Department 
submitted a plan that focused on mixing the students in pairs and clusters of racially imbalanced 
schools. 6   The NAACP endorsed the Justice Department plan even though it required  long-  
distance busing.   
                                                 
6 Magnet programs are special interest programs for the high achieving student in grades K-12. They offer advanced 
study, extended day services (elementary), expanded elective offerings, and educational choice. 
Centers for excellence are highly-specialized programs operating within-a-school featuring a voluntary, open-
admissions policy.  Both are specialized programs to entice parents to voluntarily send their children to integrated 
schools. 
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Table 1. Desegregation Timeline 
Year The Desegregation Process in East Baton Rouge Parish 
1956 Desegregation lawsuit filed on behalf of 37 African-American students 
1981 Judge Parker institutes a desegregation plan that closes 13 schools and results 
in widespread busing. The Elementary school’s part of the plan is 
implemented, while the secondary school’s part of the plan follows next 
year. 
1995 Superintendent Gary Mathews proposes a desegregation plan calling for 
community-sensitive attendance zones. The plan is debated but never goes to 
a vote.  
 
1996 
In late summer, the board, U.S. Justice Department and local NAACP agree 
on a plan that eliminates mandatory cross-town busing in favor of 
community sensitive attendance zones. Judge Parker orders it implemented 
in the form of a consent decree in time for the opening of schools. 
1997 Voters turn down a $2 billion tax plan to pay for new schools. 
19987 Voters approve a $280 million tax plan. 
1999 Parker orders the school system to change attendance zones because of over-
enrollment in some schools. 
2001 Judge Parker approves new attendance zones that results in the transfer of 
more than 2,000 students. Also, in December, the residents of the cities of 
Baker and Zachary reach an agreement with the EBRSS that allows Baker 
and Zachary schools to separate from the parish wide system. 
2003 The 47-year old desegregation case is settled.  
 
                                                 
7 In 2003, the voters renewed the collection of the sales tax for another five years.   
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Judge Parker found neither plan acceptable on its own and designed a new plan that 
borrowed partly from the other two plans. 8    Judge Parker’s desegregation orders provoked 
strong public resistance and an immediate withdrawal of many white students from the public 
school system.  The system lost about eight thousand students immediately following the court 
order, making it even harder to desegregate the system.  The drastic shift of the white students 
from public to private schools that began at the time of mandatory busing was the best indicator 
that the white flight was a result of the changes brought by an aggressive desegregation effort, 
and not by a tendency toward suburbanization.9  For example, one of the city’s largest private 
schools, Parkview Baptist, was founded in 1981, the first year of mandatory busing.  Over 1600 
students started the 2005-06 school year there.  The white flight from Baton Rouge’s public 
school system extends to teachers as well (Bankston & Caldas, 2002).   
The Louisiana Department of Education data indicate that the percentage of the student 
body that was African American jumped from 41 percent in 1980 to 44  percent in 1981.  By 
October of 2000, almost 70  percent of the students in the public school system were black.  
Also, the percentage of white students in private schools went from 20  percent in 1980, to 25  
percent in 1981, and by 1998 this percentage was at 48 percent.10  In addition, the percentage of 
black students significantly increased over the next five-year time period, rising from 66  percent 
in 1998 to 76 percent of total student enrollment; statewide, the black student enrollment 
                                                 
8 In this plan, students are randomly assigned among schools in a cluster. Paired schools draw all of their students 
from the same attendance zone, and students attend one campus for certain grades and other campus for the 
remaining grades.  
9 EBR has reported that a recent slight increase in student enrollment might suggest that the outmigration of students 
from the school system may be slowing.  However, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, East Baton Rouge Parish 
experienced a decline in population from 2000 to 2003. During the same time, Ascension Parish grew by 10.2 
percent, Livingston Parish grew by 11.1 percent, and the state grew by 0.6 percent. EBR’s population decline not 
only impacts the potential size of the public school student population, it may also weaken the tax base that supports 
the school system.  
10 Enrollment data cited throughout this section are from Louisiana Department of Education, Annual Financial 
Report, various years. 
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remained at 47 percent.  The percentage of at-risk students increased by twenty percentage 
points, from 51 percent in the 1998-99 school year to 72 percent in 2003-04; in contrast, the state 
average only increased four percentage points, from 58 percent to 62 percent.  These changes in 
demographics are reflected in achievement scores.  The Louisiana Department of Education 
disaggregates testing data based on student subgroups such as race/ethnicity or poverty status.  
The difference in performance or the achievement gap between black and white students in EBR 
is 47.4 in 2003, with whites having an average performance score of 109 and blacks having an 
average performance score of 61.6.11  East Baton Rouge Parish also has a considerable poverty 
achievement gap—slightly over 40 points—which measures the difference in performance 
between students who pay for their lunch and those who receive free or reduced price lunch.  In 
their analysis of school desegregation in Louisiana, Bankston and Caldas (2002) suggest that the 
primary cause of the enormous shift of white students from public to nonpublic schools was a 
direct result of the dismantling of neighborhood schools.  By 1995, school system officials had 
tried and failed to develop a “redesign plan” that would help desegregate schools as well as 
improve the quality of education.   
Finally, 15 years after court-ordered busing started, the board adopted a plan that 
eliminated busing in favor of “community sensitive” attendance zones and introduced magnet 
programs at inner-city majority black schools to attract white students.  Several years later, the 
board was forced to reassign students and change attendance zones in order to comply with the 
attendance limits at the public schools set in a desegregation agreement reached in 1996.  
Throughout this period, the EBRPSS experienced a significant erosion of public support 
for their schools.  As families leave the EBR school district, they take their political and financial 
                                                 
11 The performance score is out of 140. 
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support, further eroding public confidence in the system.  Even though the Consent Decree of 
1996 calls for increased school spending, voters turn down a two billion tax plan to pay for new 
schools in 1997.  However, in 1998, a much smaller tax proposal of 280 million is approved.12   
These events provide a rare opportunity to study the impact of changes in school 
assignments and school quality as measured by test scores, and racial composition on housing 
prices and time-on-market.  The move to community sensitive attendance zones allows us to 
include school quality as one of the measures of locational attributes.  Also, the subsequent 
changes in attendance zones or redistricting affect housing market in two ways.  Many houses 
are assigned to new schools, changing their locational attributes.  In addition, the houses that 
were not reassigned could be affected through peer effects to the extent that redistricting changed 
the demographic compositions of the student bodies at their school.13 Even for those houses that 
had stable school assignments, changes in attendance zone boundaries in other neighborhoods 
led to large changes in the characteristics of the students assigned to their school. 
                                                 
12 This is the first tax plan in more than 25 years. In the article that appeared in The Advocate on October 11th voters 
are urged to approve the tax bill which they call “a test of our willingness to grasp a better future for our community, 
not just in the next 18 months, but in the next 18 years, and beyond. 
13 Racial composition and socio-economic characteristics of student body are used to represent peer effects. 
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Chapter 3: School Quality and Housing Prices 
Capitalization Literature Review 
The capitalization of local public services and property taxes into house values has been 
at the center of local public finance literature for several decades.  Capitalization literature and its 
connection to community selection are often traced back to Tiebout’s (1956) argument that 
households shop for communities by comparing the different fiscal packages in different 
jurisdictions.  The process of community selection drives differences in house values reflecting 
local public service quality and property tax rates.   
Property tax capitalization arises because a house value, just like the value of other assets, 
is equal to the present value of the net benefits from owning it.  Before reviewing the literature it 
is useful to briefly explain what it is that studies try to measure.   
Let R(S) be before tax rental value per unit of housing services. This value is a function 
of local public service quality, S. Similarly, r the real discount rate, and T annual tax payment, 
then the value of the house, V, is given by  
V = (R(S)/r) - (T/r). 14 
The equation is simply saying that the amount someone is willing to pay for a house is 
the present value of the rental benefits minus the present value of the cost or property tax 
payments.  Since, by definition, tax payment is equal to the nominal tax rate, τ, multiplied by the 
assessed value of the house, then the above equation can be rewritten as  
V = (R(S)/r) - (τVa/r). 
Also, since the effective tax rate, t, is equal to nominal tax rate multiplied by the ratio of assessed 
to market value of a house the equation transforms into the following  
                                                 
14 Rather than talking about housing as a single commodity, urban economists have traditionally talked about 
“housing services” which are all the attributes and the characteristics of the house and its location. 
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V=(R(S)/r) - (tV/r) 
Solving this equation for V yields  
V = R(S)/(r + t). 
The empirical literature on capitalization attempts to determine whether capitalization 
exists and to estimate the degree of capitalization.  The estimating equation is derived from the 
asset value model and implies that the house value V is: 
V= (R(S)/r) – β(tV/r)= R(S)/(r+βt), 
Here β stands for the degree of capitalization, so that if β equals 0.5 then a $1 increase in the 
present value of property taxes leads to a $0.50 decrease in the value of a house.   
The objective of tax capitalization literature is to estimate β.  Full capitalization is 
considered to happen when, after controlling for all other housing and location characteristics, 
differences in housing prices exactly equal the present value of variations in tax liabilities.  
Partial capitalization (overcapitalization) is said to happen when differences in property values 
are less than (greater than) the differences in the present value of tax liabilities.  Fischel (2001) 
argues that partial capitalization can usually be explained by two factors: an agent’s expectations 
and inherent limitations in the data and econometric method.  For example, partial capitalization 
occurs when relevant differences among communities, such as school quality or other 
environmental attributes, are known to buyers and sellers but not to researchers, or homebuyers 
may not expect the current annual differences in taxes to last long.    
Most of the early tax capitalization studies find varying degrees of tax capitalization.  
Ross and Yinger (1999) provide an excellent survey of both the theoretical and empirical 
capitalization studies.   
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Tax capitalization is difficult to estimate for several reasons, even though the equation 
that captures it is fairly simple.  First, it cannot be estimated with linear regression methods 
because it shows a non-linear relationship between t and V.  To avoid this problem researchers 
have used various approximations or non-linear estimating techniques.  Second, the value of the 
discount rate, r, is not observed and most studies typically assume a value for r.15  Third, the 
asset-pricing logic behind capitalization equations requires assumptions about house buyers' 
expectations.  For example, this assumption predicts that a $1 increase in the present value of 
future property taxes will lead to a $1 decline in house value, given β=1.  But it does not say that 
current tax differences will be fully capitalized if they are not expected to persist.   
The studies that attempt to estimate the capitalization of publicly provided services face 
the difficulty of measuring the quality of local public services.  Existing data often do not 
provide information on many dimensions of service quality.  One approach to overcoming this 
challenge is to use government spending per capita as a measure of public service quality (Oates, 
1969,  1973) 
However, several studies, including Ladd and Yinger (1994), Caroll and Yinger (1994), 
Duncombe and Yinger (1996), argue that spending is a poor measure of service quality.  They 
show that equal per pupil expenditures among districts do not necessarily lead to equal 
educational quality because environmental conditions, service factor prices, and service 
production functions might differ among communities.  For instance, environmental factors in 
education include student body characteristics, such as the percentage of students with 
disabilities, the percentage of students living in poverty, and the family background of students.  
Researchers have shown that a district with a higher percentage of students with disabilities 
                                                 
15 The most extreme estimates in the literature, in either direction, are driven largely by strong assumptions about r. 
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needs more per pupil expenditures to achieve the same level of educational quality, all else 
equal.  Also, a district could have higher per pupil expenditures as a result of higher input prices 
in that district.  Prices of capital, labor, and other inputs differ across geographical areas.  All of 
the above mentioned concerns about using education spending to capture school quality arise 
because expenditures are an input into the education process rather than a measure of the output.   
McDougall (1976) is the first to adopt an output measure of the local services.  He uses 
the sum of median test scores for twelfth grade students, the personal crime rate, the property 
crime rate, a recreation index, and a fire insurance index as output measures of local services. 16  
Even though his study shares some of the problems of macro data studies, it is a step forward in 
the treatment of public service variables.17  
Some of the more recent service capitalization studies use student test scores, crime rates, 
or other similar data to measure local public services capitalization (Black, 1999; Bogart & 
Cromwell, 1997,  2000; Brasington, 2002b; Haurin & Brasington, 1996; Hayes & Taylor, 1996; 
Hilber & Mayer, 2001b; Weimer & Wolkoff, 2001). 
Bogart and Cromwell (1997) focus on house prices in three neighborhoods in the 
Cleveland metropolitan area, where children in each neighborhood attended public schools in 
two different districts.  In each neighborhood, all the houses were in the same municipality, and 
home owners are assumed to have enjoyed the same level of public services provided by the 
municipality.  But each neighborhood was partly in one school district and partly in another, so 
that educational services and school taxes differed among home owners in the same 
                                                 
16 Some authors argue that the test scores do not necessarily represent what the school contributes to the student’s 
academic achievement. They show that the test scores are influenced by school resources, family characteristics, and 
peers. See Hanushek  (1996) for various measures of school resources and their effect on student performance. For 
evidence on specific family characteristics, see Hanushek  (1992) and Baum (1986). 
17 Studies that use municipality or census tract as a unit of observation are considered macro data studies.  The 
dependant variable in these studies is usually Median House Value. These studies tend to have few control variables.  
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neighborhood.  Bogart and Cromwell do not have a direct measure of school quality, but in each 
neighborhood, one school district clearly had a better reputation than the other.  After accounting 
for differences in the size and quality of the houses, the authors estimate the remaining difference 
in the value of houses in what was considered the better school district in each neighborhood.18  
The estimated differences are $5,600 in the first neighborhood, $10,900 in the second, and 
$12,000 in the third.  Since Bogart and Cromwell do not control for variation in school district 
taxes, these differences in house values represent the combined effect of differences in school 
quality and taxes.  Even though Bogart and Cromwell do not have a direct measure of school 
quality, the difference in house prices between school districts implies that a better reputation for 
local schools translates into a measurable difference in house prices and outweighs the additional 
taxes incurred.   
Bogart and Cromwell’s (2000) house price study addresses redistricting effects.  For the 
data they consider, the redistricting occurred in order to improve racial integration in public 
schools.  They estimate a hedonic house price equation using a difference-in-difference 
regression technique to determine the effects of losing a neighborhood school due to the change 
in district boundaries for the Shaker Heights School District.  Their findings reveal that 
redistricting resulted in a decrease of $5,738 for an average priced house.  In order to determine 
if the unobservable neighborhood characteristics are driving their results, the authors also model 
repeat-sales in this area.  Repeat sales analysis provides another means for completely 
controlling the location-based effects while not having to define neighborhood boundaries.  This 
technique is infrequently used in empirical models because limiting the data to repeat sales 
diminishes the sample size significantly.  After reducing their sample to houses that sold twice, 
                                                 
18 In particular, house size hardly controls for the structural housing characteristics which leaves studies vulnerable 
to left-out variable bias. 
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once before the change in boundaries and once after, Bogart and Cromwell are left with 634 
home sales.  They find that mean house prices still decrease, but by $7,593 compared to the 
$5,738 found in the difference-in-differences technique.  This finding indicates that the 
unobservables from the difference-in-difference regression were not perfectly controlled. 
Even with the most accurate measure of school quality, critics argue that a reliable 
estimate of the value of a school cannot be differentiated from the location-based effects unless 
these effects are precisely controlled.  The difficulty with controlling for location-specific effects 
stems from the fact that most are unobservable and others are difficult to quantify.  Most of the 
studies use census tracts to provide neighborhood demographics, and while there is a lot of 
demographic information by tracts, they are relatively large geographic areas.  It is safe to say 
that defining a neighborhood by a census tract is more convenient than accurate.   
Black (1999) argues that properly controlling for neighborhood influences is the key to 
producing reliable estimates of any school effects; not adequately controlling for neighborhood 
characteristics inflates the positive effects of a higher quality school because better public 
schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods.  When researchers look across different 
school districts the estimated differences in house values represent the combined effect of 
differences in school quality and taxes. Rather than compare houses in different communities as 
her standard of comparison Black uses houses within the same community but in different school 
attendance zones.  Consequently, Black is able to construct a model that controls for 
neighborhood effects while at the same time avoiding the problems associated with defining 
neighborhood boundaries.  Her data contains houses on different sides of elementary school 
attendance boundary lines, but within the same district.  Thus, homes presumably have the same 
neighborhood effect, and the only difference between the homes is the elementary school that 
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children attend.  Black uses block group census data containing broad estimates of neighborhood 
characteristics such as ethnic characteristics of the population, average parent’s education, 
average age, and median household income to capture some of the variability in location.  Block 
groups are smaller geographic areas than census tracts, yet even with these controls, Black shows 
that block groups alone as neighborhood controls are not enough to provide unbiased estimates 
for the value of education. 
Black finds the coefficient on the test scores decreases by half due to the inclusion of 
neighborhood effects as captured by the boundary indicators.  With no controls other than the 
census characteristics, the average-priced house gains $9,212 for a 5 percent increase in test 
scores, but when controlling for homes within  0.35 miles of the school attendance boundary, the 
additional value for the increased test scores decreases to $4,324.  Overall she finds that, all else 
constant, parents are willing to pay about 2.1 percent more for a home where the quality of 
education, as measured by standardized test scores, increases by 5 percent.   
While the above mentioned studies examine either elementary outputs (Black, 1999; 
Bogart & Cromwell, 1997) or middle school outputs (Haurin & Brasington, 1996), they do not 
allow for separating the impact of school quality as measured by test scores and direct student 
peer effects as measured by the socio-economic characteristics of the students in the school.19   
Hayes and Taylor (1996) construct four possible indicators of school quality: current 
expenditures per pupil, average sixth-grade achievement in mathematics on the Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills, the marginal effect of the school on sixth-grade mathematics achievement, and the 
expected achievement of the student body in sixth-grade mathematics.  The first two of these 
                                                 
19 Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), and Hoxby (2000) examine the impact of racial and ethnic school 
composition on performance.  They find that the segregation by race has a strong adverse effect on school 
performance.  
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indicators are common measures of school quality in the housing literature.  The second two 
indicators represent a decomposition of average mathematics achievement into school effects 
and peer group effects.  The marginal effect of the school measures the increase in student 
achievement in mathematics that can be attributed to the school.  The expected achievement of 
the student body is also known as the peer group effect.  In Hayes and Taylor (1996), the peer 
group effect operates through test scores and is not included directly into the regression equation.  
The peer group effect serves as a possible indicator of school quality because research has shown 
that a high-achieving peer group in a school can have a positive effect on individual student 
performance (Hanushek et al., 2002; Hoxby, 2000; Summers & Wolfe, 1977).   
Peer group effects are measured by the socio-economic characteristics of students in a 
school and have been examined in the earlier studies of school desegregation decisions.  These 
studies are designed to estimate the effect of changing racial composition of local schools 
(Clotfelter, 1975; Evans & Rayburn, 1991; Gill, 1983; Jud, 1985; Jud & Watts, 1981; Vandell & 
Zerbst, 1984).  For example, Clotfelter (1975), using census tract data, looks at the changes in 
house values during the period from 1960 to 1970.  The variable of interest in this study is the 
census tracts’ changes in the proportion of blacks in census tract high schools.  The study finds 
statistically significant and inverse relationships between house values and the proportion of 
blacks in the tract. 
More recently,  Kane, Staiger, and Samms (2003) use data from North Carolina and find 
that long-run measures of school test performance (school test scores averaged over many years) 
are related to higher house prices, but they also point, to the fact that there is no evidence of 
volatility in housing prices to match the annual volatility in test scores.  They argue that the 
annual volatility in the test scores makes it difficult for home buyers to distinguish the signal 
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from the noise, and home buyers start to focus on characteristics that are unlikely to change 
quickly, such as socioeconomic characteristics of schools.  In addition, they evaluate the housing 
market’s response to the categorical ranking of school performance, created by the school 
accountability system, and find no effect from the North Carolina categorical rankings.   
Several other more recent studies that examine both the academic quality and the racial 
composition of local schools (Briggs, Clapp, & Ross, 2002; Clapp et al., 2005) find that test 
scores have no effect on housing price in a model that controls for census tract fixed effects.  
However, they find that racial, ethnic, and socio-economic composition all influence housing 
prices.   
Even though the public service capitalization literature is voluminous, there are only few 
studies that take into account the effect of the housing stock adjustment (Brasington, 2002a; Edel 
& Sclar, 1974; Hilber & Mayer, 2001a,  2002). Edel and Sclar (1974) use a sample of Boston 
municipalities and look at the nominal tax rate for the time periods 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960 and 
1970.  They assume that expanding the data over several decades allows for supply adjustment.  
They use school expenditure per student and highway maintenance per square mile as public 
service variables.  Edel and Sclar (1974)conclude that capitalization disappears in the long-run 
because of the supply adjustment.  While their study overlooks simultaneity, uses an 
inappropriate tax variable, and has few control variables, it received some positive recognition 
because it emphasizes the long-run supply adjustments. 
Brasington compares capitalization rates at the edge and center of an urban area.  His 
house price hedonic estimation is based on 27,748 houses in 122 communities in Ohio.  He 
suggests that the rate of capitalization should depend on the elasticity of housing supply.  
Because housing developer activity is stronger toward the edge of an urban area, there should be 
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a weaker rate of capitalization of taxes and public services into house prices in communities at 
the edge of an urban area.  There should be a stronger rate of capitalization toward the interior of 
an urban area where the housing supply is less elastic.  His study tests for the capitalization of 
taxes, crime, and school quality at the edge and interior of an urban area.  He consistently finds 
that school quality is positively capitalized into house values and crime is negatively capitalized 
into house values.  The study also finds that public services are always capitalized into house 
values at a considerably stronger rate toward the interior of the urban area than toward the edge, 
where developers are more active and the housing supply is more elastic.  
In another study that links the extent of house price capitalization to local spending 
decisions, Hilber and Mayer (2001a), argue that capitalization of fiscal variables and local 
amenities is higher in urban areas where there is little available land relative to capitalization in 
rural areas where land is more readily available.  Their data set of Massachusetts communities 
includes a measure of available land that varies among different communities.  Their results 
show that not only are fiscal variables and amenities capitalized to a greater extent in localities 
with little available land, but also that these localities spend more on schools and their voters are 
more likely to approve costly spending programs.    
In a subsequent study, Hilber and Mayer (2002) argue that capitalization of school 
spending into house prices can encourage residents to support spending on schools, even if the 
residents have no school age children.  The authors build on their earlier study by first extending 
the analysis to include data from school districts in 49 states to show that per pupil spending is 
positively related to population density, a proxy for the availability of land.  They show that a 
community with a density of 1,500 people per square kilometer spends $170 (3.3 percent) per 
pupil more than a community with a density of 150 people per square kilometer.  The results of 
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this study also demonstrate that a positive relationship between density and spending is even 
more significant in places with high home ownership rates.  They then show that communities 
with a higher percentage of residents above 65 years old have increased school spending only in 
places with high population densities.    
 
Theoretical Framework 
The impact of the quality of public schools on housing values can be explained intuitively 
through two components: bidding and sorting.20 
Bidding analysis builds on a number of assumptions that approximately describe urban 
areas in the United States.  Each urban area is assumed to have many neighboring jurisdictions, 
which have fixed land area and provide different bundles of local public goods and taxes.  When 
choosing a residential location, each household maximizes its utility given its income; its 
preferences for consumption of public goods and private goods; taxes and the prices of private 
goods.  
This analysis first assumes that households fall into separate income/taste classes.  
Households within a class are considered to be identical in their demands for these things, but 
many classes may exist.  Households are also assumed to be mobile and able to move costlessly 
from one jurisdiction to another.  This assumption implies that an equilibrium cannot exist unless 
all people in a given income/taste class achieve the same level of utility.  In other words, any 
household that does not reach as high a utility level as similar households will have an incentive 
to move, and this type of moving behavior will lead to a situation in which all similar households 
have the same utility (and no household has an incentive to move).  A residence in a jurisdiction 
                                                 
20 This framework is presented in more detail in Ross and Yinger, 1999.  Our discussion draws from their study.  
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is assumed to be a precondition for the receipt of public services there, and it is assumed that all 
households that live in a jurisdiction receive the same level of public services.  Finally, 
households are homeowners, not renters, and local public services are financed through a local 
property tax.  In this model, households compete with each other for access to the most attractive 
locations.  These are assumed to be locations with the best combination of high-quality public 
schools and a low property tax rate.  Households compete for entry into desirable locations by 
bidding against each other for housing.   
In the simplest case, one can consider a single income/taste class.  Because households 
are mobile, as well as alike, each household must reach the same utility level.  As a result, 
households that live in jurisdictions with relatively attractive service-tax packages must pay for 
the advantage in the form of higher housing prices. If the housing prices did not reflect the 
attractiveness of local service-tax packages then these households would be better off than 
households in other jurisdictions.  In this case, the households in other jurisdictions would have 
an incentive to move.  The argument so far can be summarized in the form of a bid function, 
which indicates the maximum amount a household would pay to live in a jurisdiction as a 
function of the attractiveness of the service-tax package there.  
Figure 1 describes the housing bids for one type of household, but, it does not tell how 
different types of households are sorted into jurisdictions.  The key to understanding sorting is to 
recognize that bid functions like the one in Figure 1 are steeper for some types of households 
than for others.  The steepness of a bid function indicates the extent to which a household type's 
bids for housing increase when the quality of public services increases.  The steepness of a bid 
function matters because landlords (or housing sellers) prefer to sell to the household type that is 
willing to pay the most per unit of housing services.  Thus, as shown in Figure 2, households 
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with relatively steep bid functions win the competition for housing in locations where the quality 
of public services is relatively high, and households with relatively flat bid functions win the 
competition for housing in locations where the quality of public services is relatively low.  For 
example, the group with the steepest bid function in this figure wins the competition for all levels 
of public service quality above S3. Under normal circumstances, high-income households have 
steeper bid functions than low-income households.   In other words, high-income households are 
willing to pay more for an increment in public service quality. This relationship between income 
and bid-function steepness implies that high-income households live in locations with relatively 
high quality-public services.  This situation is illustrated by Figure 2, in which the steeper bid 
functions (the ones to the right) belong to higher-income classes and the flatter bid functions (the 
ones to the left) belong to a lower-income class.  
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Figure 1.  Housing Bids as a Function of Public Service Quality (School Quality) 
  (Holding Property Tax Rate Constant) 
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Figure 2. Bidding and Sorting 
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The more formal model is shown in the following part.  Hilber and Mayer (2001a) use 
the same model in their study that links the extent of house price capitalization to local spending 
decisions.  The following discussion draws heavily from their study. 
We start with a model that satisfies the standard location and land market equilibrium 
conditions and then incorporate the land supply elasticity into the examination of school quality 
capitalization:  
1) No household can increase its utility by moving to another school zone;  
2) The sum of the populations of the school zones must equal the entire population of the 
metropolis and no community can have negative population; 
3) The demand for housing in each school zone equals the supply of housing; and 
4) No household can increase the utility by changing the consumption bundle. 
For the simplicity, the model presented here considers a framework in which there are 
two communities j=1,2 and N residents.  Communities in our example are equivalent to 
neighborhoods defined by school attendance boundaries.  If, in equilibrium, households cannot 
increase their utility by moving from one community to another, then there is an income level, 
y*, such that 
*)y),1(p,e(V*)y),1(p,e(V 222111 ττ +=+ .    (1) 
This condition is also called a boundary condition.  Two more equilibrium conditions are related 
to the land market or housing market 
)p(H))1(p(hn jjjjj =+τ      (2) 
and  
N),p(n),p(n 222111 =+ ττ .     (3) 
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where e is the school quality or education services provided by local public schools; hj  is the 
demand for housing per resident; and H(pj ) is the housing supply function.21  These two 
conditions require that the demand for land by households with y<y* equal the supply of land in 
community 1 and the demand for land by households with y>y* equal the supply of land in 
community 2. 
  To evaluate the impact of higher school quality in one community to prices in both 
communities the above mentioned equations form a system that is differentiated with respect to 
e1  as follows: 
 *)y),1(p,e(V*)y),1(p,e(V 222111 ττ +=+ ,   (1) 
using (2) and (3) we obtain 
N
))1(p(h
)p(H
))1(p(h
)p(H
222
22
111
11 =+++ ττ .   (4) 
These two equations are the equilibrium conditions that determine p1 and p2.  After some 
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Similarly, ε2 denotes elasticity in the community 2.    
                                                 
21 The results are analogous to the case with an elastic supply of land. Housing supply is used here to simplify the 
analysis. 
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Solving (5) gives the following comparative static results:  
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2 < .  In another words, higher public school quality in the community 1 will drive house 
prices in that community to be higher than those in the community 2, all else equal.   
To evaluate the impact of land supply elasticity on the extent of capitalization (6) and (7) 
can be differentiated with the respect to ε1s using the quotient rule. 
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If we assume that ( )ds εε − , population sizes and prices are positive and given that the 
denominator of (8) must always be positive, it follows that  
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 is always negative.  In 
another words, the extent of school quality capitalization in one community decreases with 
increasing housing supply elasticity in that community. 
31
 
When comparative statics of the model equilibrium are simplified to include only two 
communities, they provide some important insights.  The higher public school quality in one 
community will drive house prices in that community to be higher than in the other community, 
all else equal.  However, the extent of capitalization depends on the elasticity of the housing 
supply; the capitalization of an increase in public school quality in community one decreases 
with increasing housing supply elasticity in that community.  
In short, the theoretical model predicts that if communities can freely expand their 
housing stock in response to an increase in the public school quality, then a change in demand 
for housing causes little or no change in house prices.  In this environment, the change in school 
quality is not capitalized into prices.  
 
Data and Empirical Methodology 
In the hedonic price model, the price of a house is a function of its physical 
characteristics and neighborhood characteristics, such as public school attendance areas.  
Housing is an example of a good that is unique and that has many quality dimensions.  Houses 
are modeled as single commodities that differ in the amount of various characteristics they 
contain (building materials, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, etc.).  Consumers derive utility 
from the different characteristics of the commodity, and producers incur the costs that depend on 
the varieties they provide.  The interaction of consumers and producers in this type of market 
determines the equilibrium hedonic price schedule.   
In a model developed by Rosen (1974) in which certain products are a composite of 
several characteristics represented by a vector x = (x1, x2,….,xn), the equilibrium price for any one 
product is a function of the different characteristics of the product. This function is called an 
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hedonic price function P = P(x).  The hedonic price model allows us to isolate the effects of 
individual characteristics on a composite good.  Coefficient estimates of the hedonic model can 
be translated as the implicit prices, or as consumers’ willingness to pay for different 
characteristics of the composite good. 
In the literature on school characteristics and house values, the primary challenges have 
been to adequately measure the quality of the neighborhood and school and then empirically 
separate those two effects.  Selecting appropriate measures of neighborhood quality has proven 
difficult, especially because the polycentric nature of the modern metropolitan area makes the 
simple measures, such as distance to the central business district, inappropriate.  Several 
approaches have been used to address this issue.  
Black (1999) uses the across-the-street estimation approach focusing on differences in 
housing values near school boundaries.  Presumably, houses studied with this approach have the 
same neighborhood effect, and the only difference between the houses is the elementary school 
that children attend.  Similarly, Figlio and Lucas (2000) use a fixed effects specification that 
captures any characteristics about properties in a given subdivision that change together over 
time.  These fixed effects are defined at the neighborhood calendar year level.   
 
Empirical Specifications 
 The empirical hedonic price function can be defined as follows:  
inkttinkktinkt Z)Pln( εωΓδα ++++=     (1) 
where Pinkt is the price of house i in neighborhood n in school k at time t. Zkt are the year-specific 
school level attributes, which includes school district performance as measured by standard test 
scores and socioeconomic and demographic composition of the students.  
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Γink is a term that captures non-school time-invariant observable attributes of the unit including 
the neighborhood.  εinkt is a time-variant unobservable that is assumed to be randomly distributed 
and uncorrelated with Zkt and Γink, ωt’s are the time fixed effects like year, season, and month the 
house sold .  Equation (1) is the baseline hedonic model. 
We define the time-invariant unit attributes as a function of observed housing unit 
attributes (Xi) and neighborhood attributes (Wn). 
niink WX µβΓ +=      (2) 
Equation (2) requires the assumption that unobserved unit and neighborhood attributes are 
uncorrelated with Xi as well as Wn.  This specification uses neighborhood controls based on the 
decennial census. 
We also estimate our results by considering only those houses that are geographically 
close to the school attendance boundary.  We do this by rewriting equation (2) as  
biink KX φβΓ += ,     (3) 
where Kb is the vector of boundary dummies that represent the unique boundary that house i is 
associated with, the nearest boundary.  The estimating equation now becomes: 
inkttbiktinkt KXZ)Pln( εωφβδα +++++= .   (4) 
Equation (4) is equivalent to calculating differences in house prices on opposite sides of 
attendance boundaries while accounting for house characteristics and relating the differences in 
prices to school quality information.  In this approach, the boundary dummies allow us to 
account for any unobserved neighborhood characteristics of houses on either side of an 
attendance boundary. 
In the next specification, we focus on the existence of nonlinear effects of school quality.  
Chiodo, Hernandez-Murillo and Owyang (2005) argue that the linear specification of 
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specification (4) presupposes that the marginal valuation of below-average schools is equal to the 
valuation of above-average schools and results in a constant premium on school quality.  They 
reexamine this assumption and consider the possibility that the capitalization premium varies 
over the range of school qualities.  The nonlinearity in their model reflects two aspects of the 
market for public education via housing.  First, alternative schooling arrangements (e.g., private 
school, home schooling, magnet schools, etc.) can provide home buyers with high quality 
education even if they choose to live in below average school districts.  Second, if house buyers 
have positive valuations for education, they may concentrate their efforts among the highest 
quality attendance zones, yielding increasing market tightness as school quality increases.  
Buyers may face increased competition for the highest quality schools and a rapidly increasing 
premium for houses in those attendance zones.  Thus, linear valuations for education can induce 
a nonlinear education premium. To allow for this possibility we rewrite (4) as  
inkttbiktinkt KX)z(f)Pln( εωφβα +++++=    (5) 
where f(zkt) represents a potentially nonlinear function of school quality.  We call this 
specification a nonlinear boundary fixed effects model.  
Finally, we examine the theoretical prediction that the degree to which house prices 
capitalize local amenities varies depending on the supply of land for new housing. To do this, we 
split the sample into two groups, based on an indicator of land supply elasticity.  Our most direct 
measure of the land supply elasticity is the percentage of new residential construction in each 
community, census tract.  We expect the coefficients on the school quality characteristics in the 
capitalization equation to be larger in the group of communities with little available land.   
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An alternative approach to comparing houses with stable school assignments at a point in 
time is to compare houses affected by redistricting over time. 22  Redistricting affected locational 
amenities in two distinct ways.  First, and most obviously, many houses were assigned to new 
schools.  In addition, even houses that were not reassigned may have been affected by 
redistricting through peer effects if, by changing boundaries elsewhere, the redistricting 
significantly altered the mix of students attending a school.  
To analyze the effect of redistricting on housing vales, we use the full sample of housing 
transactions from 1999 to 2002, including both houses with original school assignments and 
houses that were reassigned.  This specification is similar to using analysis of original school 
assignments except that a new measure of school quality is used.  This new measure is school’s 
categorical ranking and is based on the school performance score, SPS.23 The SPS, a tool used in 
the Louisiana School Accountability Program, is the primary measure of overall school 
performance.  
In summary, this chapter estimates four models to examine the original establishment of 
the community sensitive attendance boundaries, the standard hedonic model, equations (1) and 
(2); the attendance boundary fixed effects model, equations (1) and (3); the nonlinear standard 
hedonic and boundary fixed effects models, equation (5); and one model that examines 
redistricting: the standard hedonic model, equations (1) and (2).  In addition, we also estimate the 
same models for two different sub-samples that differ by their housing supply elasticities.  
  
                                                 
22 Since the district faced the court order to achieve a racial mix of students in the schools, the school assignment 
areas crossed many existing neighborhood boundaries, which helps us separate the effects of school quality and 
neighborhood amenities.  
23 Starting in 1999, Louisiana Department of Education published school performance scores (SPS) for every public 
school. The SPS is based on the attendance and test performance of all students. 
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School and Housing Data 
 We restrict our analysis to detached single family houses and elementary school 
attendance zones.  Each unit of observation is described by variables reflecting its physical 
characteristics, the quality of local elementary school to which children in the household are 
assigned, and the characteristics of the neighborhood in which the house is located.  
 This study uses housing data that draws from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) sales 
reports for Baton Rouge, Louisiana for nine years from 1994 through 2002.  Each house is 
geocoded to a specific elementary school and census tract.  The house characteristics include 
common features such as Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Age, Living area, and Net area.  Living area 
and Net area are measured in thousands of square feet (Net area = Total area under the roof – 
Living area).  The house characteristics also include location, which is indicated by dummy 
variables for MLS areas.24   
   Our analysis considers two different sources of variation to separate the effects of schools 
and other neighborhood characteristics: differences in housing prices along attendance zone 
boundaries and changes in housing prices following the change is school assignments.  The first 
approach uses data from 1994 through 1998.  We use the percentage of students at the 
proficiency level on standardized tests, the percentage of students qualifying for the free lunch 
program, and the school racial composition to assess the quality of schools.  We obtain school 
quality data from the State of Louisiana Progress Profiles for the years 1994 through 2002.  
These variables take on a value of zero prior to September 1996 since East Baton Rouge Parish 
was under mandatory busing and students were not assigned to elementary schools based on their 
residence location.  The EBRPSS provided us with the maps of the school attendance areas as 
                                                 
24 The subject area covers contiguous region and excludes houses in Baker and Zachary. 
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they were designed by the Consent Decree in 1996, as well as the new attendance zones 
implemented after redistricting in 2001.     
This study uses the census tract as proxy for neighborhood.  The neighborhood 
characteristics are defined based on 89 tracts in East Baton Rouge Parish during the 2000 
Decennial Census.  The data used include median household income, percent black in tract, 
percent of owner occupied housing units, and percent of children of preschool and school age. 
Finally, to capture market conditions, the specification includes year, season, and month 
fixed effects based on the sales date in our housing data.  
Figures 3 and 4 plot the locations of the elementary schools in 1996 and identify East 
Baton Rouge Parish’s school attendance boundaries as described in the Consent Decree.  Figures 
3 and 4 also show the geographical area of census tracts.  In addition, Figure 4 highlights the 
boundary sample used in the boundary fixed effects specification.   
Table 2 gives the summary statistics over 1994-1998 of the variables that enter into 
regression analysis.  The dependent variable, house sales price, is adjusted for inflation and the 
mean of $124,812 is in year 1999 dollars. Variables under the heading House Attributes, include 
num_beds, number of bedrooms (3.28), fullbath, number of full bathrooms (2.04), livarea, living 
area in thousand square feet (1.912), and netarea,  net area (.688).  School Attributes are the 
percent of students passing on standardized tests, test, (mean of 90.06 percent, standard deviation 
of 6.30 percent); the percent of blacks, non-Hispanic, black_school, (mean of  50.50 percent, 
standard deviation of 24.01 percent); and the percent of students qualifying for free lunch, 
lunch_school, (mean of 47.90 percent, standard deviation of 21.10 percent).  Even after years of 
court ordered desegregation, the percent black in school ranges from 6.7 percent to 100 percent.  
The range of free lunch students is similar to percent black students with minimum at 6.6 percent 
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and maximum of 94.4 percent.  This demonstrates substantial variations in school 
characteristics.25 
The variables used to describe neighborhood characteristics are under Tract Attributes 
and include: medHH99, median household income in thousands of ’99 $ (mean of $50. 016); 
blackP, percent black (mean of 22.52 percent); kidsP1, percent preschoolers (mean of 7 percent); 
kidsP2, percent school age children (mean of 18.49 percent); and ownerP, percent of owner 
occupied housing units (mean of 66.70 percent).  In addition, the average percent enrolled in 
private schools in the census tract, enrollP, is 5.2 percent with standard deviation of 8.3 
percent.26 
 
                                                 
25 School averages are calculated using only houses sold after the publication of the Consent Decree document 
containing school attendance zones.  These cover sales made after June, 1996. 
26 Private school enrollment data comes from National Center of Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core Data 
(CCD). 
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Figure 3. East Baton Rouge Parish: Elementary School Attendance Zones and Census Tracts. 
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Figure 4. East Baton Rouge Parish: Boundary Sample. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: 1994-199827 
Variable (Description) Number 
of Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
Dependent Variable      
soldprR (sold price in '99$) 10640 124812.2 57246.1 40000 358146.5
  
School Attributes  
test (percent passing CRCT) 7533 90.055 6.272 60.750 99.750
black_school (percent black in school) 7533 0.505 0.240 0.067 1.000
lunch_school (percent on free lunch) 7533 0.479 0.211 0.066 0.944
  
House Attributes  
tom (time-on-market) 10640 78.581 63.208 14.000 365.000
num_beds (number of bedrooms) 10640 3.277 0.632 1.000 6.000
fullbath (number of fullbath) 10640 2.041 0.484 1.000 4.000
livarea (living area in thousand sq. feet) 10640 1.912 0.569 0.555 4.460
netarea (total area-living area) 10640 0.688 0.287 0.100 1.995
  
Tract Attributes  
ownerP (percent of owner occupied 
housing) 
10640 0.667 0.188 0.051 0.909
blackP (percent black in tract) 10640 0.225 0.238 0.010 0.984
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5) 10640 0.070 0.018 0.018 0.126
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17) 10640 0.185 0.042 0.032 0.326
medHH99 (median household income in 
thousand  '99$)   
10640 50.016 15.323 11.397 78.509
enrollP (percent enrolled in private 
schools) 
10640 0.052 0.083 0.000 0.373
 
                                                 
27 School averages are taken over the units sold after the Consent Decree was made public, so that they cover sales 
made after June, 1996. 
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Table 3 gives the summary statistics over 1999-2002 of the variables that enter into the 
regression analysis following the school reassignments.  The dependent variable, house sale 
price, is adjusted for inflation, and the mean of $129,283 is in year 1999 dollars.  Variables under 
the heading House Attributes, include the number of bedrooms (3.23), number of full bathrooms 
(2.02), living area in thousand square feet (1.898), and net area (.675).  School Attributes include 
the change in categorical ranking based on a change in the SPS; the change in percent of blacks, 
non-Hispanic (mean of 5.14 percent, standard deviation of 8.20 percent); and the change in 
percent of students qualifying for free lunch (mean of 6.03 percent, standard deviation of 6.70 
percent).  Starting in 1998-99 school year, Louisiana’s School and District Accountability 
System reports a SPS for every public school. This score is calculated using index results from 
three parts: the LEAP 21 tests, the Iowa Tests and the Attendance Index. School Performance 
Labels are assigned based on this score. There are six performance categories: School of 
Academic Excellence, 0 percent in the district; School of Academic Distinction, 1 percent in the 
district; School of Academic Achievement, 5 percent in the district; Academically Above 
Average, 33 percent in the district; Academically below average, 57 percent in the district; and 
Academically Unacceptable, 4 percent in the district.28  For each school we construct a set of 
dummies “SPS Improve” and “SPS Worse” that use the information about the school’s 
performance category between two accountability cycles. For houses that are in the areas 
affected by re-assignments we construct a set of dummies “SPS Improve” and “SPS Worse” that 
use the information about the school’s performance category before and after the re-assignment.  
In this case, “SPS Improve” equals one for a unit of observation if the school’s performance 
category improves between two periods, under 1996 school assignment and 2001 school 
                                                 
28 All schools receive an annual growth target and are expected to reach a score of 120 by the 2013-14 school year.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics: 1999-2002 
Variable (Description) Number 
of Obs. 
Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Dependent Variable      
soldprR (sold price in '99$) 6414 129283.6 54784.23 40000 320000
   
School Attributes  
sps Improve (school improved 
rating) 
6414 0.188 0.390 0.000 1.000
sps Worse (school lowered rating) 6414 0.061 0.240 0.000 1.000
reassign (reassignment dummy) 6414 0.126 0.332 0.000 1.000
blackChange (change in percent 
black in school)  
6414 0.051 0.082 -0.183 0.666
freelunchChange (change in 
percent on free lunch) 
6414 0.060 0.067 -0.216 0.381
   
House Attributes  
tom (time-on-market) 6414 68.608 44.559 14.000 180.000
num_beds (number of bedrooms) 6414 3.232 0.626 1.000 5.000
fullbath (number of fullbath) 6414 2.024 0.503 1.000 5.000
livarea (living area in thousand sq. 
feet) 
6414 1.870 0.545 0.703 4.435
netarea (total area-living area) 6414 0.675 0.282 0.110 1.995
   
Tract Attributes  
blackP (percent black in tract) 6414 0.208 0.231 0.010 0.984
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5) 6414 0.069 0.018 0.018 0.126
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17) 6414 0.184 0.042 0.032 0.326
medHH99 (median household 
income in thousand '99$) 
6414 50.331 14.774 11.397 78.509
enrollP (percent enrolled in private 
schools) 
6414 0.054 0.084 0.000 0.373
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assignment.  In our sample, 18.6 percent sees an improvement in their school’s categorical 
ranking, while only a little over 6 percent sees a decline in their school’s standing.  This 
improved ranking is due to reassignment in 10 percent of our sample.  Over 70 percent of our 
sample does not see any changes in their school’s categorical ranking even though 12.6 percent 
of them are reassigned to different schools.  
The variables used to describe neighborhood characteristics, Tract Attributes, are the 
same as in the first regression analysis that considers the original school assignments. 
 
Results 
Results Based on Original School Assignments.29 Table 4 presents the results of the 
parameter estimates.  The first column shows a pooled cross-sectional analysis using baseline or  
traditional hedonics with linear specification and neighborhood controls drawn form census tract 
variables.  The second column uses traditional hedonics with non-linear specification.  Here, we 
consider a possibility that the capitalization premium varies over the range of school qualities.  
The nonlinearity in our model might be necessary to capture the alternative schooling 
arrangements (e.g., private school, home schooling, magnet schools, etc.) that can provide home 
buyers with high-quality education even if they choose to live in below-average school districts.  
The last two columns present regression results using boundary fixed effects.  For this analysis, 
we determine the attendance boundaries for 60 elementary schools in East Baton Rouge Parish.  
We follow Black (1999) and include in the sample only houses within a 0.35 mile buffer of the 
attendance boundary.  In this restricted sample there are 6,801 single family residences. 
                                                 
29 This section covers the time period 1994-1998. 
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Table 4. Regression Results Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ‘99$) 
 (1) 
BASELINE 
HEDONIC 
(2) 
BASELINE 
HEDONIC 
(3) 
BOUNDARY 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
(4) 
BOUNDARY 
FIXED  
EFFECTS 
Regressors Linear Non-linear Linear Non-linear 
     
School Attributes     
Test  -0.000246 -0.00246 0.000766 -0.00447 
 (0.00069) (0.0079) (0.00085) (0.011) 
test sq  0.0000103  0.0000310 
  (0.000046)  (0.000062) 
black_school  0.0362 0.0269 0.0650* -0.128 
 (0.025) (0.068) (0.039) (0.13) 
black_school sq   -0.00825  0.157 
  (0.064)  (0.11) 
lunch_school  -0.0629** 0.182** -0.0639 0.205 
 (0.030) (0.080) (0.050) (0.14) 
lunch_school sq   -0.239***  -0.233* 
  (0.080)  (0.13) 
     
House Attributes     
TOM  -0.000253*** -0.000254*** -0.000231*** -0.000231*** 
 (0.000027) (0.000027) (0.000034) (0.000034) 
num_beds  0.00143 0.00198 0.0194*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Fullbath  0.0194*** 0.0184*** 0.00648 0.00639 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Livarea  0.472*** 0.471*** 0.449*** 0.449*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
Netarea  0.151*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
     
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year and season 
sold. 
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Our results in the Table 4 show that housing comparables enter the house pricing equation with 
the expected sign.  Increases in the living area, net area and the number of bathrooms increase 
the price of a house, on average.  The coefficient on the time-on-market (TOM) variable that 
measures marketing time is consistently negative and significant at a 1 percent level across all of 
the specifications.  This implies that house sellers in Baton Rouge lower their reservation price as 
the marketing duration increases.   
In summary, the coefficients on the house attributes are very stable across different 
specifications. 
On the other hand, the estimated effects of school attributes are sensitive to the model 
specification.  The coefficient on the test scores is positive in the boundary fixed effects model, 
column III in the Table 4 but is negative in baseline hedonic specification and both non-linear 
specifications, columns I, II and IV respectively.  Yet, it is statistically insignificant across all 
four specifications.  It could be argued that this coefficient understates the school-quality 
capitalization, in part, because the district does not consistently publish the student achievement 
data for its six within-school magnet programs, wherein magnet and traditional students attend 
the same school but different classes.  Approximately 8 percent of the district’s black population 
and 12 percent of its non-black population are enrolled in the magnet program.  A brief analysis 
conducted by the district reveals that magnet students perform significantly better than the total 
student population in schools offering within-school magnet programs.  This line of argument is 
supported by Hoyt (2003), which looks at the impact of open enrollment programs on property 
values in the districts participating in the program.  Since open enrollment program eliminates 
the need to reside in a higher quality district to receive its educational services it reduces 
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property values there while increasing them in the lower quality districts.  Hoyt’s study finds 
evidence that property values are lower in cities and townships where school districts have had a 
net influx of students after the introduction of choice programs and higher where the net transfer 
has been out of the district.30  
Another possible explanation arises from the approach used in the analysis.  The most 
important feature of attendance boundaries that make them useful for this estimation is that they 
are unchanging.  The existence of this feature is what homeowners use when forming their 
expectations about the local school.  It is plausible that, since the attendance boundaries were 
drawn in August of 1996, EBR homeowners do not have enough time to evaluate the information 
about local schools and include that information in their pricing decisions.  Similarly, according 
to school district administrators, when attendance boundaries were first determined, the district 
made every “reasonable good-faith effort” to desegregate the system while considering the size 
of the school, the distribution of students by grade level, natural boundaries, and, in some cases, 
family economics and neighborhoods.  Anecdotal evidence points that the boundaries, once 
drawn, were not meeting the requirements spelled in the Consent Decree and needed to be 
redrawn.31  We use this implication of instability of the boundary sample and look at the school 
                                                 
30 The predicted impacts of the open enrollment programs on property values found using Hoyt’s model are 
consistent with those found by Epple and Romano (1995) using a model that incorporates peer group effects and is 
numerically solved. Also, Nechyba (1999; 2000) examines the impacts of vouchers for private schools programs and 
Nechyba (2003) examines public school choice using a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of a 
metropolitan area. His models generate reductions in property values in wealthy school districts when either a 
private-school voucher or public school choice program is introduced. 
31 For example, on September 27, 1996, shortly after the Decree was implemented, The Board sought permission to 
exceed the proposed enrollment in 17 schools. Similar motions were filed on September 24, 1997 and October 23, 
1998.  It became apparent that the Board will have to redraw the boundaries in order to comply with Consent Decree 
requirements.  
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quality capitalization while excluding the boundary sample.32 Even after such an exercise, we do 
not find any evidence of test score capitalization.  
Additionally, our results indicate that the representation of blacks in local public schools 
either leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for the test scores or has 
no effect.  This finding is similar to Norris (2002), which examines the school quality 
capitalization in six Louisiana parishes.33 Norris argues that when the enrollment of low-income 
minorities in a school increases, the test scores suffer and the property values fall.  But, for the 
most part, families don’t tend to move away from schools simply because they have a growing 
enrollment of minorities.  We can conclude that property values are not significantly influenced 
by racial integration, but they do respond negatively to increases in students qualifying for the 
free lunch program.  When looking at the baseline hedonic regression, specification (1), the 
coefficient suggests that an increase of one standard deviation of students on free lunch  is 
associated with a 1.3 percent decrease in housing prices, or a decrease of approximately $1,623 
at the mean (the mean house price is $124,812).  This figure is very alarming since the 
percentage of at-risk students in the school system increased by 20 percentage points, from 
51percent in the 1998-99 school year to 72 percent in 2003-04. 34 
Another interesting result in Table 4 is that the percent of school-age children enrolled in 
private schools has a negative effect on property values, possibly indicating that some houses 
must be sold at discounted prices to capture the cost of private education.  This result is 
consistent across all specifications and it shows that one standard deviation increase in the 
enrollment in private schools is associated with about 0.7 percent decrease in housing prices.  
                                                 
32 These results are reported in the Appendix A. 
33 Norris (1999) data covers six parishes with large shares of ethnic minorities, blacks in particular. He does not 
include East Baton Rouge Parish is his analysis. 
34 Students are classified as at-risk if they qualify for either free lunch or reduced-price lunch.  
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When looking at boundary fixed effects regression, specification (3) and (4), the coefficient 
suggests even larger impact of private schools enrollment, about 1.03 percent.   
Table 5 shows the results of regression analysis where we consider the possibility that 
land availability affects the extent of house value capitalization.35  In examining differential 
capitalization, we divide the sample into two groups based on an indicator of land supply 
elasticity.  Our most direct measure is the percentage of new construction in each census tract.  
Our first group includes observations in all census tracts where the new construction was less 
than 25 percent of all houses offered for sale, and it is twice as big as the second group where the 
new construction is greater or equal to 25 percent.  Contrary to the theoretical discussion, school 
variables are always capitalized into house values at a significantly stronger rate where housing 
supply is more elastic.  School variables are generally not related to housing prices in 
communities where the new construction is less than 25 percent of all houses on the market.  
 On the other hand, school variables appear to be capitalized into house values in 
communities where the new construction is more than 25 percent of all houses on the market.  
We see the same pattern as in the earlier estimation: increasing the percent of blacks in schools 
increases housing prices while increasing the percent on free lunch decreases the housing values.  
It is also important to note that the coefficient in private school enrollment enters house price 
equations with different signs. It is negative and statistically significant in the sample with less 
elastic housing supply.  On the other hand, it is positive, but with no statistical significance, in 
the sample with more elastic housing supply.  
In conclusion, our results indicate that house buyers are sensitive to differences in school 
quality and school racial composition, but the amount they are willing to pay depends on a  
                                                 
35 Table 5 focuses only on school and neighborhood quality measures. All other regression results are presented in 
the Appendix B.  
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Table 5. Regression Results: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is New Construction in the Census 
Tract: Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $) 
 (1) NEW 
HOUSING <.25 
(2) NEW 
HOUSING >.25 
 Baseline Linear Baseline Linear 
Regressors lnsoldprR lnsoldprR 
   
School Attributes   
test -0.00112 0.000250 
 (0.00069) (0.0011) 
black_school -0.0208 0.249*** 
 (0.030) (0.040) 
lunch_school -0.0541 -0.125** 
 (0.037) (0.051) 
   
Tract Attributes   
enrollP -0.133*** 0.00532 
 (0.030) (0.073) 
   
Observations 7171 3469 
R-squared 0.85 0.91 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes, 
house age, mls area, year and season sold.  
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number of factors and the parameter estimates are sensitive to the specification of the model.  
Another important set of results from this study relates to the subject of race and public schools.  
The data illustrates that in the area of East Baton Rouge Parish with larger shares of ethnic 
minorities, after controlling for the effect of test scores, the representation of blacks in public 
schools either leads to an increase in property values or has no effect.  In short, the housing 
market is not directly discounting schools on the bases of race alone.    
Results Based on Re-assignments.36  Table 6 reports estimates of the relationship between school 
quality measures and house prices while focusing on school re-assignments.  We present results 
of pooled cross-sectional analysis using baseline or traditional hedonics with log-linear 
specification and neighborhood controls drawn from census tract variables.  Consistent with the 
analysis based on the original school assignments, we again show that housing comparables enter 
the house pricing equation with the expected sign.  Increases in the living area, net area and the 
number of bathrooms increase the price of a house, on average.  The coefficient on the time-on-
market (TOM) variable that measures marketing time is consistently negative and significant at a 
1 percent level across all of the specifications.  For a second time, this would imply that house 
sellers in Baton Rouge lower their reservation price as the duration of sale increases. Instead of 
test scores, we use a set of binary variables (SPS Improve, SPS Worse) that is equal to one if the 
house is in the school attendance zone that has a  positive/negative change to its categorical 
performance measure.37  Many schools in the EBRSS have long been low performing schools 
and we have a reason to believe that buyers might be interested in trends in school quality. Using 
these variables allows us to examine not just short-term fluctuations in test scores but also 
longer-term progress.  We also use another binary variable that captures the change in school 
                                                 
36 This section covers the period over 1999-2002. 
37 We present our results using year specific level values in the Appendix C. 
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Table 6. Regression Results Based on School Reassignments: Dependent Variable: ln(sold price 
in ‘99$) 
 
 (1) Baseline hedonic (2) Baseline hedonic 
  With dummy variable 
interactions 
Regressors   
School Attributes   
sps Improve 0.0516*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0075) 
sps Worse -0.000666 -0.00253 
 (0.0093) (0.011) 
blackChange 0.222*** 0.182*** 
 (0.058) (0.068) 
sps Improve * Reassign  -0.0585*** 
  (0.022) 
sps Worse * Reassign  0.0135 
  (0.019) 
blackChange * Reassign  0.0937 
  (0.11) 
freelunchChange -0.0948 -0.0515 
 (0.061) (0.10) 
freelunchChange * Reassign  -0.167 
  (0.13) 
Reassign 0.00940 0.0212** 
 (0.0056) (0.0099) 
House Attributes   
TOM -0.000163*** -0.000164*** 
 (0.000045) (0.000045) 
num_beds 0.00236 0.00240 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Fullbath 0.0274*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Livarea 0.426*** 0.425*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0084) 
Netarea 0.135*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) 
 
 
53
 
Table 6 (continued). 
 (1) Baseline hedonic (2) Baseline hedonic 
  With dummy variable 
interactions 
Regressors   
Tract Attributes   
blackP 0.0136 0.00625 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
kidsP1 0.275* 0.239 
 (0.17) (0.18) 
kidsP2 -0.406*** -0.354*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
medHH99 0.00398*** 0.00382*** 
 (0.00034) (0.00035) 
enrollP -0.00994 -0.0166 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
   
Constant 10.82*** 10.83*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Observations 6414 6414 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season, and 
month sold.  
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reassignments, so that it is equal to one if the house has been reassigned to a different school 
after the 2001 change in attendance boundaries.  Our results in Table 6 indicate that, holding 
other factors fixed, an improvement in categorical ranking of school performance is associated 
with a 5.61 percent increase in housing prices.  On the other hand, we see no penalty for schools 
that see a decline in their categorical ranking.  We can conclude that house prices in these school 
zones are based on comparables.   
Table 6 also shows the regression result when we allow for interaction between dummy 
variables for schools’ categorical ranking change and reassignment.  The base group consists of 
houses that are in the school attendance areas that have not changed their categorical ranking and 
have not been reassigned.  Even though the coefficient on reassignment indicator, reassign, is 
positive, our results indicate that the estimated return of improved categorical ranking is 
somewhat lessened if a house is re-assigned to a different school.  The differential between those 
houses that are reassigned to schools with higher categorical ranking than their previous schools, 
relative to those who have not changed either school or its ranking, is about 2 percent.  This 
differential is equivalent to an increase of about $2,582 at the mean (the mean house price is 
$129, 115). We conclude that the decrease in the premium for better schools indicates parents’ 
dislike of abrupt changes in their school environment.   
Our results, once again, suggest that the representation of blacks in local public schools 
leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for the test scores.  An increase 
of one standard deviation in change of percent blacks in a school is associated with an increase 
of 1.5 percent in the house price.  At the same time, changes in student body eligible for free 
lunch are not capitalized into house prices.   
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In addition, Table 7 shows the results of regression analysis when we consider the 
possibility that land availability affects the extent of house value capitalization.38  Following the 
earlier procedure, we divide the sample into two groups based on an indicator of land supply 
elasticity, or the percentage of new construction in each census tract.  As before, the first group 
includes observations in all census tracts where the new construction was less than 25 percent of 
all houses offered for sale, and it is more than twice as big as the second group where the new 
construction is greater than 25 percent.  The estimates reveal different capitalization rate for two 
groups.   
First, considering the neighborhoods with a less elastic supply of housing, column I of 
Table 7, we report that the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 7.8 
percent increase in the house price.  At the mean, this is equivalent to $9,227 (the mean house 
price in this sub-sample is $118,300).  We also see that there is a penalty equivalent to a 5.5 
percent of house price associated with houses in the schools that saw a decrease in their 
categorical ranking relative to those houses that saw no change in their school rankings.  Within 
these neighborhoods, for given levels of school and house characteristics, the difference in 
log(price) between a house that changes school assignment and one that does not is 0.023. This 
means that a house that is reassigned to a different elementary school is predicted to sell for 
about 2.3 percent more, holding other factors fixed.   
Consistent with our earlier findings, these results suggest that the representation of blacks 
in local public schools leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for the 
test scores, while in this sub-sample a positive change in student body eligible for free lunch 
lowers housing prices.  
                                                 
38 Once again, we focus on school quality variables; full regression results are presented in the Appendix. 
56
 
Table 7. Regression Results Based on School Reassignments: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is 
New Construction in the Census Tract: Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $) 
 (1)NEW 
HOUSING<=.25 
(2)NEW 
HOUSING>.25 
Regressors   
   
School Attributes   
sps Improve 0.0779*** 0.0583*** 
 (0.011) (0.022) 
sps Worse -0.0548*** 0.0126 
 (0.017) (0.012) 
blackChange 0.474*** -0.488*** 
 (0.088) (0.25) 
freelunchChange -0.193** -0.337 
 (0.077) (0.54) 
reassign 0.0226*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0071) (0.053) 
Tract Attributes   
enrollP -0.0617 0.688*** 
 (0.038) (0.11) 
   
Observations 4544 1870 
R-squared 0.84 0.91 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes, 
house age, mls area, year, season, and month sold.  
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As predicted by the theoretical model, the neighborhoods with a more elastic supply of 
housing show evidence of weaker rates of school quality capitalization.  Column II of the Table 
7 reports that the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 5.8 percent  
increase in the house price.  However, this is equivalent to about $9,028 at the mean, only $200 
less than in the sample with a less elastic housing supply.  The mean house price in our sample of 
more elastic housing supply is a $155,670.39  Figure 5  shows the location of houses in this 
sample.  We also find no penalty associated with houses in the schools that see a decrease in 
their categorical ranking relative to those houses that see no change in their school rankings.  
Within these neighborhoods, for given levels of school and house characteristics, the difference 
in log(price) between a house that changes school assignment and one that does not is 0.144.  
This means that a house that is reassigned to a different elementary school is predicted to sell for 
about 14.4 percent more, holding other factors fixed.40  This finding seems conceivable since 
EBR homeowners were aware that the EBRPSS will have to redraw the boundaries in order to 
comply with Consent Decree enrollment requirements.  The reassignments sent kids from 
overcrowded schools to a different school in their neighborhood proximity.     
Conflicting with the earlier findings, our results here suggest that the increase in percent 
of black students in school leads to a decrease in property values after controlling directly for the 
test scores, while in this sub-sample a positive change in student body eligible for free lunch is 
negative but not statistically significant.  It is also important to note that the coefficient on 
private school enrollment enters house pricing equations with different signs.  While it is 
negative and very small in the sample with less elastic housing supply, this coefficient is positive 
                                                 
39 We plot this sample and show that it mostly consists of suburban homes.  
40 EBRPSS administrators confirmed that following the attendance zones changes, some schools in the parish 
outskirts saw a significant increase in student enrollment.   
58
 
in our suburban sample.  It indicates that an increase of one standard deviation in the percent of 
children in the census tract that attend private schools leads to a 3 percent increase in house 
price.  We suspect that this coefficient captures the additional value parents place on the 
availability of private schooling options.  
Sensitivity Tests  
One of the challenges in the housing literature is separating the value of school test scores 
from other neighborhood amenities.  Researchers have to account for a complication that arises 
because better schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods.  As a result, not controlling 
adequately for neighborhood characteristics may overestimate the value of better schools.  Black 
(1999) argues that any differences in unmeasured neighborhood characteristics would be 
minimal if one considers properties very close to each other but on the opposite sides of 
attendance zone boundaries.  Others have argued that the similarity in neighborhood 
characteristics that might exist when the boundaries are initially drawn may not last long as those 
houses are bought and sold.  They suggest that potentially unobserved differences in 
neighborhoods near school attendance boundaries are relevant and still bias the estimates for the 
effects of test performance on housing prices.  This would imply that the areas being compared 
are not really the same neighborhoods.   
Black (1999) runs a number of sensitivity tests to investigate this concern including 
creating artificial attendance boundaries.  We do not worry about school attendance boundaries 
being potential neighborhood partitions since, under a court-imposed desegregation plan in place 
from 1981, the district imposed mandatory busing for its students, and it was not until 1996 that 
the district adopted community sensitive attendance zones.    
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We test the results’ sensitivity in a number of ways.  First, we compare the results 
obtained for data subsets for one-, two- and three-bedroom houses with the results for four- or 
more bedroom houses.  We assume that people who live in houses with more bedrooms are more 
likely to have children, and are therefore willing to pay more for better schools than people in 
houses with fewer bedrooms.   
Table 8 reports the estimates from the model that examines school reassignments, 
specification (1), along with the results we obtained when the sample is divided into sub-samples 
based on a number of bedrooms.  Focusing on the second and third column, we note different 
rates of capitalization.  Here, we examine changes in schools’ categorical ranking and observe 
that there are some major differences between the two sub-samples.  For example, negative 
changes in schools’ categorical ranking, and percent free lunch are statistically significant in the 
sub-sample of houses with three- and fewer bedrooms (column II).  The coefficients on these 
variables indicate that lowering school’s categorical ranking is associated with a 2.2 percent 
decrease in house value, while increasing the change in percent free lunch is expected to lower 
house values by 13 percent.  Neither one of these two coefficients appear to be statistically 
significant in the house price equation for our sub-sample of houses with more than three-
bedrooms.  Other school variables enter both equations with the same signs but different 
magnitudes; however, once interpreted at the mean, their impact is very similar.  
Figure 5 plots the locations of houses divided in our sub-samples based on number of 
bedrooms and percent of new construction for the estimation that considers original school 
assignments.  These sub-samples appear to be very comparable and divide the data into inner city 
and suburban samples.  Consequently, our results are similar to the results from regression 
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analysis where we consider the possibility that land availability affects the extent of house value 
capitalization.  
Second, if the quality of the local public school affects the value of houses in that locality, then 
homeowners will vote for better schools.  We argue that homeowners’ concerns about the values 
of their major asset make them more attentive to the benefits and costs of public education.  
Fischel (2001) suggests that people who are motivated by house values are more likely to vote in 
school related elections and have more knowledge of how schools are actually performing.  If a 
capitalization phenomenon is in part explained by homebuyers’ expectations and knowledge 
about locational amenities, we propose that capitalization rates revealed by more informed 
communities are better estimates of true capitalization. Thus, our findings in Table 9 reinforce 
the idea that the capitalization results are due to the differences in elementary schools.  We 
collect voting returns from the school tax proposal in November 1998.  Each house is geocoded 
to a specific elementary school, voting precinct and census tract.  Next, we divide the sample 
based on precinct vote into: vote “yes” and, vote “no.”  These results are presented in Table 9.  
Similarly, Figure 5 plots the locations of houses in these two voting sub-samples.  Our results 
indicate stronger capitalization of improvement in the categorical ranking for those houses that 
are located in precincts voting “yes” to the tax bill.  For example, an improvement in a 
categorical ranking is associated with about a $9,100 increase in the house price at the mean  (the 
mean house price is $130,129) as compared to about $5,300 increase at the mean for houses 
located in precincts voting “no” (the mean house price is $106,659).   
Finally, we consider a specification test to determine whether the nonlinear model in the 
regression based on original school assignments is preferred to the linear model.  Table 10 shows 
the comparison.  The explanatory power as computed by the adjusted R2 of each of the 
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specifications is identical but according to the p-value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the two specifications are different.  This suggests that the quadratic terms are not important.  
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Table 8. Regression Results when sample is divided based on a number of bedrooms:  
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $) 
 (1) 
 Full sample 
(2) 
num_beds<=3 
(3) 
num_beds>3 
Regressors    
School Attributes    
Sps Improve 0.0516*** 0.0557*** 0.0477*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0092) (0.010) 
Sps Worse -0.000666 -0.0222* 0.0226 
 (0.0093) (0.012) (0.014) 
blackChange 0.222*** 0.291*** 0.152* 
 (0.058) (0.076) (0.088) 
Sps Improve * reassign    
    
Sps Worse * reassign    
    
blackChange * reassign    
    
freelunchChange -0.0948 -0.130* -0.0233 
 (0.061) (0.078) (0.11) 
freelunchChange * reassign    
    
reassign 0.00940 0.00582 0.000467 
 (0.0056) (0.0070) (0.0090) 
Constant 10.82*** 10.65*** 11.45*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.097) 
Observations 6414 4432 1982 
R-squared 0.86 0.81 0.86 
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Table 8 (continued). 
 (4)  
Full sample 
(5) 
num_beds<=3 
(6) 
num_beds>3 
Regressors    
School Attributes    
Sps Improve 0.0561*** 0.0563*** 0.0521*** 
 (0.0075) (0.010) (0.011) 
Sps Worse -0.00253 -0.0232* 0.0202 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) 
blackChange 0.182*** 0.330*** -0.0245 
 (0.068) (0.085) (0.12) 
Sps Improve * reassign -0.0585*** -0.00245 -0.0369 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.038) 
Sps Worse * reassign 0.0135 0.0111 -0.00486 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.037) 
blackChange * reassign 0.0937 -0.0986 0.400** 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) 
freelunchChange -0.0515 -0.211 0.396** 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) 
freelunchChange * reassign -0.167 0.137 -0.674*** 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) 
reassign 0.0212** 0.00192 0.0167 
 (0.0099) (0.015) (0.016) 
Constant 10.83*** 10.65*** 11.45*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.097) 
Observations 6414 4432 1982 
R-squared 0.86 0.81 0.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes, 
house age, mls area, year and season sold. 
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Figure 5. Sub-Samples  
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Table 9. Regression Results when sample is divided based on a school vote:  
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $) 
 (1) 
 Full sample 
(2)  
Vote Yes 
(3)  
Vote No 
Regressors    
School Attributes    
Sps Improve 0.0516*** 0.0708*** 0.0494* 
 (0.0070) (0.0086) (0.031) 
Sps Worse -0.000666 0.000667 -0.0467 
 (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.038) 
blackChange 0.222*** 0.189*** 0.408*** 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.12) 
Sps Improve * reassign    
    
Sps Worse * reassign    
    
blackChange * reassign    
    
freelunchChange -0.0948 -0.0573 0.264* 
 (0.061) (0.068) (0.14) 
freelunchChange * reassign    
    
reassign 0.00940 -0.0104 -0.00983 
 (0.0056) (0.0063) (0.015) 
Constant 10.82*** 10.90*** 11.52*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.23) 
Observations 6414 4600 1083 
R-squared 0.86 0.87 0.82 
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Table 9 (continued). 
 (4)  
Full sample 
(5) 
Vote Yes 
(6)  
Vote No 
Regressors    
School Attributes    
Sps Improve 0.0561*** 0.0813*** 0.0168 
 (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.040) 
Sps Worse -0.00253 -0.0159 -0.00338 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.059) 
blackChange 0.182*** 0.120 -0.192 
 (0.068) (0.083) (0.24) 
Sps Improve * reassign -0.0585*** -0.103*** -0.0820 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.10) 
Sps Worse * reassign 0.0135 0.0629** 0.00760 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.12) 
blackChange * reassign 0.0937 0.149 0.791*** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.28) 
freelunchChange -0.0515 0.262** 1.162*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.41) 
freelunchChange * reassign -0.167 -0.551*** -1.376*** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.47) 
reassign 0.0212** 0.0182* 0.0632 
 (0.0099) (0.011) (0.043) 
Constant 10.83*** 10.91*** 11.46*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.23) 
Observations 6414 4600 1083 
R-squared 0.86 0.87 0.82 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes, 
house age, mls area, year and season sold. 
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Table 10. Specification Test on Boundary Fixed Effects. 
MODEL   ADJUSTED R-SQUARED     
 
Linear boundary fixed effects       0.88                           LR test  =      4.08 
Nonlinear boundary fixed effects   0.88                           Prob>χ2 =    0.2528 
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Conclusion 
This study uses data from East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana from 1994 through 2002 
to explain the relationship between property values and variables that include school 
performance and school racial composition.  The choice of East Baton Rouge Parish enables us 
to deal effectively with a number of important issues in the housing literature.  
First, public schools are only one of the public services attached to any particular 
location.  Since we consider a single school district and political jurisdiction, we can adequately 
control for the provision of public services other than elementary education.41 Second, the factors 
that determine neighborhood quality are hard to identify and compute. In order to control for 
neighborhood effects, we follow the approach introduced first by Black (1999), where we restrict 
our sample to houses in close proximity to elementary schools’ attendance boundaries.   
Additionally, several events make East Baton Rouge Parish an ideal place to study the 
effect of school test scores and school racial composition on house prices.  First, under a court-
imposed desegregation plan in place from 1981 through 1996, the district imposed random 
school assignments for its students.42  In an effort to achieve racial balance, formerly white and 
formerly black schools were paired or clustered, and students were bused to their clusters based 
on the need to create racial balance.  These kinds of desegregation orders created strong public 
resistance and a migration of white students from the public school system.  Finally, 15 years 
after court-ordered random assignments started, the district adopted a plan that eliminated busing 
in favor of “community sensitive” attendance zones, which were drawn to maximize a sense of 
community ownership of the schools.43 The move to community sensitive attendance zones 
                                                 
41 We focus on elementary schools because only these schools allow for enough within district variation. 
42 The school district is governed by East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. 
43 Consent Decree, page 2. 
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allows us to include school quality as one of the measures of locational amenities. 
Our findings, based on the initial school assignments, show that the housing market does 
not seem to be sensitive to increases in test scores.  We attribute this to many changes that East 
Baton Rouge Parish School System has been through because of its battle with school 
desegregation law suits.  As suggested by Kane et al.(2003), a school that is improving has a 
difficult time signaling that improvement to the buyers in the housing market.  Similarly, the 
availability of choice programs and instability of school attendance boundaries would also 
contribute to underestimation of school quality capitalization. 44  However, when considering 
race, the statistical result is encouraging.  We find that the housing market is not directly 
discounting schools based on race.  There is an indication that the representation of blacks in 
local public schools either leads to an increase in property values or has no effect, after 
controlling directly for the test scores. On the other hand, the housing market shows that prices 
do respond negatively to increases in students qualifying for the free lunch program.   
Our findings based on reassignments show that housing prices respond to improvements 
in the categorical ranking of school performance but do not penalize for schools whose 
categorical rankings decline.  The results indicate that the estimated return of improved 
categorical ranking is somewhat lessened if a house is reassigned to a different school.  Earlier 
work by Figlio and Lucas (2000) about Florida finds some evidence that public disclosure of 
school report cards has an impact on house values. 45  We show that the improvement in 
categorical ranking has large impact on housing prices.  Yet again, we find that the housing 
market is not directly discounting schools based on race.   
                                                 
44 The district runs a number of choice programs such as magnet program, and majority-to-minority transfers.  
45 Florida schools were assigned grades A-F based on test performance.  
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When considering the impact of housing supply elasticity on capitalization we split the 
sample into two parts based on the percentage of new construction, a proxy for available 
developable land.  The coefficients on school variables are less stable and contrary to the 
theoretical predictions in the house price equation that considers the initial establishment of 
school attendance boundaries.  School variables are generally not related to house prices in 
communities where the new construction is less than 25 percent of all houses on the market.  On 
the other hand, school variables appear to be capitalized into house values in communities where 
the new construction is more than 25 percent of all houses on the market.  We argue that since 
our sample with lower housing supply elasticity represents inner-city housing, these schools have 
been low performing schools for some time and were known as such to house buyers.  We do see 
that house prices in this sample account for private school enrollments and discount house 
values. 
 When education policymakers are pondering investments in education they must 
consider the costs involved as well as the benefits.  The results of this research provide valuable 
information for evaluating the economic benefits of a current political issue such as school 
testing and accountability.  The housing market reveals that the type of grading system used or 
the indicators of quality can have a large effect on property values.  For example, our study 
indicates that in considering a neighborhood with a less elastic supply of housing, concentrated 
mostly in a central city, the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 7.8 
percent increase in the house price.  At the mean, this is equivalent to $9,227 (the mean house 
price in this sub-sample is $118,300).  Similarly, there is a penalty equivalent to a 5.5 percent of 
house price associated with houses in the schools that saw a decrease in their categorical ranking 
relative to those houses that saw no change in their school rankings.  This result implies that 
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central city house values are more elastic with respect to improvements in elementary school 
categorical rankings.  Thus, improving elementary schools has a great potential for increasing 
house values, and, as a consequence, revenue from property taxes. 
Our unique data provides a rare opportunity to study how a sudden exogenous change in 
public policy impacts the housing market. The changes in school assignment implemented by 
East Baton Rouge Parish School System are a natural experiment in education policy. Because 
the school district was operating under a court-imposed desegregation order, we can observe the 
effects of these exogenous changes on housing market locational amenities.  Such exogenous 
change allows us to use classical statistical theory that works only if variations in data occur 
randomly. Furthermore, the empirical findings of the effect of land availability on the extent of 
school quality capitalization have strong implications for future theoretical and empirical studies 
in the housing literature.   
A house is typically a person's largest asset.  The quality of local public schools is often a 
major consideration when a family with school-age children looks for a house to buy, and a 
child’s placement in public elementary school is based on a family’s residential location.  Thus, a 
family with school-age children makes two investment decisions when it chooses a residential 
location: the first is the investment in housing, and the second is the investment in the human 
capital of their child.  Most families are risk-averse agents who are, at once, investing in housing 
and education, both long-term and illiquid portfolio investments.  Even though numerous studies 
look at house buyers’ valuations of school quality, there is little attention given to its effect on 
liquidity.   In the next chapter we turn our focus to the impact of school performance and school 
racial composition on liquidity.  By taking into account the interrelationship between prices and 
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time-on-market, this dissertation offers a more complete estimate of the impact of changes in 
school characteristics on the housing market than previous research offers.  
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Chapter 4:  School Quality and Housing Market Liquidity 
Time-on-Market Literature Review 
Housing is a heterogeneous good that is spatially distinct.  Buyers and sellers must 
expend resources to find potential matches and complete a transaction.  Thus, in addition to 
pricing, the time component of the search process, or liquidity, is also relevant.  Liquidity is 
usually defined as an asset characteristic that reflects how quickly the asset can be sold at a given 
price.  In essence, the price-setting problem is an exercise in how to balance the desire to sell at a 
high price with the reality that high priced houses are likely to stay on the market for a long time.  
Thus, a common measure of liquidity is the time-to-sale under optimal pricing, or time-on-
market (TOM).   
The literature concerning the contribution of house characteristics or locational attributes 
to marketing time can be broken down into the theoretical and empirical studies. The observation 
that exchange in the housing market takes place only after agents conduct a search suggests that 
it is possible to borrow models developed in other areas of economics, such as labor economics, 
to study asset pricing. 46   However, in this summary, we focus our attention only on the 
empirical studies of TOM and its determinants.  The body of work on this issue is less extensive 
and more recent than the price capitalization literature.  This is in part due to the lack of 
agreement over the proper methodology to be employed in estimating TOM.   
                                                 
46 Lippman and McCall(1986) are among the first to adapt such models to real estate asset pricing. Haurin (1988) 
adopts a very similar model.  One shortcoming of both models is that the analysis is conducted in a partial 
equilibrium framework.  The authors take the behavior of house buyers as given and model only the behavior of a 
house seller.  Arnott (1989) introduces the buyer’s problem into the model, but he simply assumes that they take the 
house with the lowest price.  Wheaton (1990) is one of the first authors that jointly model the buying and selling 
decision.  Even though Wheaton (1990) incorporates both buyers and sellers into his model, one shortcoming is that 
the analysis is conducted exclusively in the steady state.  Williams (1995)extends Wheaton’s model to a dynamic 
setting.   
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Cubin (1974 ) examines the relationship between price and TOM for home sales in 
Coventry, England, between June 1968 and June 1970.  He initially develops a “quality 
adjusted” price, which represents the difference between the actual sales price and expected sales 
price generated by a hedonic-type estimation based on specific home characteristics.  Cubin 
assumes a geometric distribution for TOM.  
He hypothesizes that houses with positive quality adjusted prices will take longer to sell.  
The study uses the log of TOM as a dependent variable and uses the least square technique to 
regress it on the quality adjusted price and house characteristics.  Contrary to his hypothesis, the 
results show that a house with a higher quality adjusted prices sells faster.  Cubin argues that this 
result is possible since a buyer might use price as a signal of home quality.  For example, the 
buyer assumes there is superior quality and lower repair expenses in a higher priced home.  Also, 
Cubin raises the possibility that a least squares regression model is not capturing the simultaneity 
between price and TOM.   
Belkin et al.(1976) introduce the effects of submarkets on TOM.  In this study, buyers are 
limited to a specific geographic area and price level, resulting in separate supply and demand 
characteristics for each submarket.  The authors use a price level submarket of about 1000 
transactions in the Hartford, Connecticut, area in 1970 and 1973.  In order to maintain an 
identical information level for all transactions they limit the study to MLS sold homes.   They 
specify TOM as an exponential process. 
The main argument of this study is that TOM measures value and submarket 
performance.  In essence, similar houses with the same price in the same submarket should have 
the same TOM.  They also argue that the probability of selling a house is not influenced by 
TOM.  The main findings reveal that price concessions made by an owner increase over time, 
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making the home more attractive to buyers.  Another interesting finding of this study is that 
housing features do not influence TOM within a particular submarket.  
Trippi (1977) argues that price and TOM should be positively related since the 
probability of selling a property is inversely related to the price of the property.  He also 
contends that TOM follows an exponential process. This study uses residential income property 
units sold in San Diego County between April 1973 and October 1974.  Trippi uses canonical 
analysis and argues that this method avoids a simultaneity problem between price and TOM.  He 
chooses the log of TOM and the log of the ratio of income to price as dependent variables.  The 
empirical results support his hypothesis and show that price and TOM are positively related.  
Miller (1978) uses a multiple regression model to examine the relationship between TOM 
and price for 91 residential units sold in Columbus, Ohio, in the latter half of 1976. His model 
uses selling price as the dependent variable. His argument, which says that a seller with lower 
search or opportunity costs can wait for a higher offer, also, calls for a positive relationship 
between TOM and price.  The study’s empirical results support his argument.  Miller also argues 
that since both variables, selling time and price, are influenced by the characteristics of the 
property (size, location, quality of public services), the simultaneous influence makes the study 
of the relationship between time-on-market and selling price difficult.  He states that unless a 
market can be located where the equilibrium or average time-on-market is stable and equal 
across all price ranges, locations, and sizes within the sample, traditional statistical approaches 
and empirical tests are questionable. 
Zuehlke (1987) examines the sale probability of a home, given its elapsed TOM.  The 
analysis is based on a sample of 290 single-family properties in Tallahassee, Florida, in February 
1982.  Zuelhke employs a Weibull hazard model to show that an owner becomes more risk 
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averse over time and lowers his reservation price.  He also finds that this is more evident for 
vacant homes.   
Haurin (1988) tests the impact of price dispersion on TOM for 219 sales in a 
neighborhood in Columbus, Ohio, between April 1976 and April 1977.  The central argument of 
this study is that atypical units, the units that have odd features or characteristics when compared 
to other homes in the area, are subject to a greater dispersion of offering prices, resulting in a 
longer TOM.  The argument arises from the assumption that the seller is aware that buyers value 
atypical characteristics differently, thus, the seller expects a wider distribution of offers.  Haurin 
argues that the seller believes it is worthwhile to wait longer in hope of receiving a higher offer.  
The author uses survival regression to analyze TOM and finds that atypical houses take longer to 
sell.  His findings also reveal that TOM falls when a house is listed with a large broker.   
Kang and Gardner (1989) employ OLS estimation techniques to explore how property 
marketing time is influenced by the complex relationship between selling price, listing price, 
property characteristics, and market conditions.  Using data from the Mclean County, Indiana, 
the authors find a positive relationship between new loan rates and marketing time, shorter 
marketing time for newly constructed properties, and the lack of a size effect on property 
marketing time. 
Ferreira and Sirmans (1989)examine two different market regimes to determine whether 
home sellers concede assumption financing premiums to buyers in order to reduce TOM.  Their 
data covers 51 assumption-financed home sales and 66 conventionally financed home sales in 
1975 and 1976, and 68 assumption-financed home sales and 62 conventionally financed home 
sales in 1980 in Greenville, South Carolina.  They model TOM using two-stage least squares.  In 
the first stage, they model the log of time as a function of the ratio of list price to selling price 
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and average conventional mortgage rate.  The second stage, then, includes a hedonic price 
model, where the log of price is regressed against home characteristics, TOM, and the cash 
equivalent of the financing premium.  Their findings are mixed. For the first time period, they 
report that sellers did not negotiate away the financing premium to reduce TOM.  However, in 
1980, the financing premium is conceded to buyers to achieve a faster sale.  The authors attribute 
the difference in the seller strategy to the depressed market conditions in 1980.  
Even though the tradeoff between selling price and TOM is well recognized, most of the 
existing literature examines the impact of housing attributes on either selling price or TOM.  
Several recent studies estimate a property’s selling price and TOM jointly (Huang & Palmquist, 
2001; Knight, 2002; Sirmans, Turnbull, & Benjamin, 1991; Turnbull & Dombrow, 2005).  To 
capture the possibility that selling price and TOM are interactive variables, some studies estimate 
simultaneous or two-stage models.  Various aspects of the market environment, including both 
economic market factors and property characteristics, affect the liquidity of the housing market 
as well as selling prices.  For example, age of the structure sometimes acts as a proxy for housing 
condition; as a house ages, it deteriorates physically.  Additionally, a house’s design might be 
outdated, and the demand for such a house is likely to be reduced.  It is anticipated that the 
marketing time for older houses would be longer.  Similarly, higher selling prices are anticipated 
for Spring and Summer sales.  Furthermore, it is shown that seasonality affects the marketing 
time in the residential real estate market (Haurin, 1988; Kluger & Miller, 1990). For instance, 
families with children are less motivated to either buy or sell houses when school is in session.  
Consequently, technical problems arise because the specifications of both the price and TOM 
models are similar.  The following is a brief summary of such studies. 
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Forgey, Rutherford, and Springer (1996)focus on the impact of search effort and liquidity 
when they estimate a two-stage least squares model of house prices and TOM.  They use data 
from 3358 single-family house sales in Arlington, Texas, between May 1991 and June 1993.  In 
the first stage, the dependent variable is the log of TOM.  Consistent with earlier TOM studies, 
their results of the first stage show that TOM depends on the seller’s search effort, market 
conditions, physical characteristics of the property, the size of the brokerage firm, and listing 
price.  They then use the predicted values and residuals from stage one to create the expected 
time-on-market variable and the relative difference of the actual selling time and expected time-
on-market.  In the second stage, the dependent variable is the log of the selling price.  The 
findings of the second stage indicate that increases in expected TOM result in higher sales prices.  
This result supports the notion that a sales price will increase as a seller more throughly searches 
the market for the highest offer.  The findings of the second stage also indicate that deviations 
from the expected time-on-market are inversly related to selling prices.  This result supports the 
notion that buyers will pay a premium for properties that are more liquid relative to other 
properties.   
Another study that implements OLS models for selling price and TOM is Haag, 
Rutherford and Thomson (2000).  The hedonic price model of this study makes the typical 
assumption that the log of the sales price of a house is a function of housing characteristics, 
location, seasonality controls, TOM, and the real estate agents' comments.47 The TOM equation 
is very similar. The log of the marketing time of a house is a function of housing characteristics, 
                                                 
47 Many studies examine a role of real estate agents or brokerage on the sales price (Benjamin, Jud, & Sirmans, 
2000; Yavas & Yang, 1995).  The provision of a multiple listing service (MLS) allows agents to search for 
properties that will fit the client’s needs.  This listing contains information regarding age, size, number of bedrooms, 
number of bathrooms, and other physical characteristics.  For each listing on MLS, a section is provided for agents 
to furnish additional information about the property.  Examples of these remarks include “Well maintained home,” 
“Ready to sell,” and “New paint.” 
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location, seasonality controls, listing price, and the real estate agents' comments.  They find that 
TOM has a significant negative effect on selling price, but the list price is shown to be not 
significant in the TOM equation.  According to their results, motivated sellers accept lower 
selling prices. Updated properties produce a higher selling price and a shorter selling time.  
However, the authors find that some other improvements such as new paint and roof work 
decrease price and increase TOM.   
Huang and Palmquist (2001) investigate the total impact of an enviromental disamenity, 
in this case highway noise, on property values and TOM.  They first estimate the reservation 
price by using the hedonic reservation price model and assuming that the reservation price is 
determined by characteristics of a house and a random component that captures the price 
variation not explained by housing characteristics.  They then describe the TOM model using 
survival analysis.  The empirical analysis of the Kingsgate, Washington, housing market shows 
that highway noise has no significant impact on TOM, but it has a significant negative impact on 
reservation and sale prices.   
In examining the effect of exclusive agency and exclusive-right-to-sale contracts, 
Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) estimate a two-equation simultaneous equations model 
for selling price and TOM. The first stage regresses TOM against various factors, and the second 
stage regresses selling price against a similar set of factors.  The only difference between the two 
equations is that the seasonality controls are constructed based on the list date in the TOM 
equation and sales date in the price equation.  The results show a positive relationship between 
selling price and selling time and that exclusive agency listings and builder-owned listings have a 
shorter selling time than exclusive-right-to-sale listings and owner-held properties.  Their 
findings support the theorethical model that shows the seller being better off with an exclusive 
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agency contract than an exclusive-right-to-sell contract because the former results in greater 
broker effort which, in turn, leads to faster sale.  However, exclusive agency listings are 
associated with lower selling prices while builder-owned properties have higher selling prices.  
A 2001 study by Johnson, Salter, Zumpano and Anderson examines the effect of artificial 
stucco on house prices and selling time. 48  They use a game theoretic framework to model the 
interaction between buyers and sellers.  They first run a probit model to relate the presence of 
artificial siding to explanatory variables.  Next, they estimate the selling price using atypical 
explanatory variables with artificial stucco included.  Finally, they use duration modeling to 
measure the effect of artificial stucco on selling time.  Their results suggest that properties with 
artificial stucco sell at a premium although the selling time is longer. 
Knight (2002) considers the causes and effects of changes in list price on the selling price 
and TOM connection.  Following Yavas and Yang (1995) and Forgey et al. (1996), Knight 
employs a two-stage least squares model to control for possible simultaneity bias in the selling 
price and TOM models.  In general, the model regresses the log of selling price on TOM, 
marketing choices of the seller, physical characteristics of the house, location, and time of sale.  
Marketing choices of the seller are the size of commission offered by the seller and the size of 
the listing firm used by the seller.  Similarly, their model of TOM includes signals of seller 
motivation, aspects of the home that affect its marketability or increase the seller’s search costs, 
and a time trend to control for market conditions. Specifically, the factors signaling seller 
motivation include the list price markup over expected selling price, owner financing, size of 
commission offered by the seller, and the size of the listing firm.  Knight proposes that by using 
heterogeneity as a composite representation of the principal attributes, the study is able to 
                                                 
48 Artificial stucco is formally known as Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems.  
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employ the individual house’s physical characteristics to identify the time-on-market equation 
and permit two-stage least squares estimation. 
 In the first stage, he estimates predicted values of the two endogenous variables, selling 
price and TOM, and in the second stage he makes a substitution of these predicted values as 
explanatory variables in each of the individual structural equations.  The study finds that the two 
most important determinants of price revision are the total length of time the home is marketed 
and the amount by which the home is overpriced initially.  He also reports that homes with large 
percentage adjustments in listing price not only had longer selling times but also ultimately sold 
at lower average selling prices. 
Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) use a two-stage process to estimate the impact of 
the list price on the trade-off between selling price and TOM.  In the first step of their analysis, 
they estimate the expected list price based on house characteristics and market conditions.  They 
then use this information to create the degree of overpricing, the percentage difference between 
the actual listing price and the expected listing price.49   Their theoretical model shows that there 
is no direct tradeoff between selling price and selling time but that market conditions affect how 
the expected selling price and the expected selling time vary jointly based on the initial listing 
price.  They estimate a TOM model using a hazard model with a Weibull distribution.  Their 
study finds that increases in the list price increase TOM.   
Most recently, Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) examine how spatial competition and 
shopping externalities affect house selling prices and TOM.  They base their empirical model on 
the simultaneous equations model, and improve on previous studies that use the hedonic price 
approach by controlling for localized demand and supply conditions.  The different elements in 
                                                 
49 Other papers that focus on the degree of overpricing include Glower, Hendershott and Haurin (1998), Anglin and 
Wieber (2004). 
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the neighborhood supply and demand conditions vectors ensure that both regression equations 
are identified in the 2SLS estimation, thus, solving price-TOM equations identification problems.  
In addition, using a measure for spatial competition removes source of spatial correlation in 
housing data.50 Their study finds that housing prices and TOM reflect both competitive and 
shopping externality effects from neighboring houses.  
In summary, the literature on asset liquidity yields important insights into the sources of 
liquidity.  It is possible that the market illiquidity arises because of the fact that real estate buyers 
are heterogeneous.  Some buyers attach higher valuations to a given house than others.  
Therefore, a seller has an incentive to wait for the buyers with the highest valuations.  For 
example, buyers who care about education may concentrate their efforts in the highest quality 
school attendance zones, creating an increasing tight housing market as school quality increases.  
These buyers might also face increased competition for the highest quality schools and rapidly 
increasing premiums or lower illiquidity for houses in those attendance zones.   
 In the next section we investigate the relation of locational amenities and liquidity.  In 
particular, we study how changes in school performance and school racial composition impact 
simultaneously determined house price and marketing time.  By taking into account the 
interrelationship between prices and time-on-market, this dissertation provides a more complete 
estimate of the impact of changes in school characteristics on the housing market than previous 
research offers.  
 
                                                 
50 Such measure is appropriate because, among other reasons, when a house is put on the market, the list price is 
often set with the knowledge of selling price of similar houses in the neighborhood. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The search theory originates in labor economics (Kiefer & Neumann, 1979; Lippman & 
McCall, 1986; Mortensen, 1970), and it has wide applications for understanding the natural 
unemployment rate, unemployment insurance, and government policies such as the minimum 
wage.  The standard search theory can also be applied to describe house sellers.  Indeed, the 
problem facing a consumer looking for the lowest price or an unemployed agent looking for the 
best paying job is structurally the same as the problem faced by a homeowner looking for a 
buyer.    
On the theoretical side, Arnott (1989) establishes a one-sided search model to examine a 
seller’s search behavior and the vacancy rate.  Arnott’s results show that vacancies are socially 
useful because they give households more choices.  Wheaton (1990) uses a two-sided search 
model to match up sellers and buyers to study the equilibrium vacancy rate in the housing 
market.   
The housing market is such that there is no central marketplace where investors can trade.  
Buyers must search for sellers.  Search is costly because agents are not able to instantly complete 
the trades.  For example, a potential buyer cannot value a house without actually walking 
through it.  Two agents can walk through the same house, yet attach very different subjective 
values to it.  Buyers and sellers meet and determine whether there is an incentive to trade.  If 
there is no incentive, the agents wait for another pairing.  The process of identifying houses on 
the market and then visiting them can be expensive both in terms of money and time.  This 
heterogeneity of preferences plays an important role in determining how liquid the market is.    
The model used here is a search-theoretic model, developed in Krainer and LeRoy 
(2002), where prices and TOM are derived from the maximizing behavior of both buyers and 
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sellers.  The main purpose of the model is to generate state-dependant liquidity.  In this case, the 
state variable describes the quality of local public schools and takes on just two values, low and 
high.  State-varying liquidity implies that prices do not absorb all of the gains (losses) in asset 
values when the environment switches from state to state.  The model offers two important 
observations.  First, the probability of sale in the high state is greater than it is in the low state; 
expected TOM is shorter in the high state.  Second, prices are higher in the high state.   
The model and its properties are fully developed in Krainer and Leroy (2002). The 
discussion below draws heavily from their study. 
The main assumption in such a model is that agents form expectations about the kinds of 
transactions that are realistic in the economy and then meet prospective trading partners 
consecutively.  The main purpose of the model is to describe agents’ decision rules in this 
setting.  For example, a seller must decide how much to charge for a house.  In fact, a seller 
forms expectations about how much buyers are willing to pay for a house, and the seller must 
decide when to accept an offer and when to reject it.  The trade-off for a seller, then, is to weigh 
the benefits of further searching against the costs of delaying the sale.  The benefits of further 
search are based on the possibility that a buyer may arrive who attaches greater value to the 
house.  On the other hand, the costs of sale delay include the agent’s delay of consumption and 
uncertainty that arises from the fact that once the agent rejects an offer it is unclear when the next 
satisfactory offer will arrive.  Similarly, a buyer can compute the value of owning a house by 
capitalizing the expected housing services the house provides and comparing this value to the 
selling price, taking into consideration the opportunity to continue to search for another house.  
It is assumed that agents who live in houses have a “match” with their houses and 
consume housing services.  In the real world it is uncommon for people to live in the same house 
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for an entire lifetime.  Agents can lose a “match” with their houses.  The arrival of children may 
cause a family to leave a small house in favor of a bigger one.  A homeowner may sell a house 
because he takes a new job in another city.  When an agent loses his match, he moves out 
immediately and puts the old house up for sale.  An agent who leaves the house must specify a 
pricing rule for the old house and a search strategy that is utility maximizing.  To make the 
problem more realistic, we assume that not all agents have the same preferences for houses that 
they visit.  Differences in their preferences mean that the search process may take time.  
More formally, assume there are a large number of agents in an economy and they 
consume two goods: housing services and a background good.  They are risk neutral in both 
goods.  Also assume that the consumption of the background good at any date equals the 
negative of their net expenditures on housing at that date.  There is a fixed number of houses in 
the economy and no depreciation of the existing housing stock.  
An agent who owns and lives in a house enjoys a per period housing service flow, λ.  
This service flow is constant for as long as an agent lives in the house.  It is assumed that agents 
leave their houses because agents lose their “match” with their houses.  We capture the notion of 
mobility by assuming that the “match” of an agent with a house persists each period with 
probability π.  When an agent leaves a house and searches for a new one, she draws a new  λ 
from the uniform distribution F on the interval [0,1].51  Draws from this distribution by potential 
buyers are independent.   
Once an agent loses the “match”, the house does not provide a service flow to its owner, 
and the owner puts it on the market.  As a seller, an agent views the house merely as an asset and 
attempts to sell the house for as much as possible.  Each period, a potential buyer visits the 
                                                 
51 For the simplicity of the discussion sellers of houses will be male and buyers female. 
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empty house and determines how much she likes the house.  She either pays the asking price 
posted by the seller or chooses not to buy, in which case, she does not consume any housing 
services in that period and searches again in the next.  The steady state equilibrium in this 
economy consists of utility maximizing decision rules for both buyers and sellers. 
The price setting decision is made before the seller has any knowledge of the dividend 
that the house will provide to the visitor. Thus, the seller cannot be sure how much the visitor is 
willing to pay for the house. This combination of asymmetric information and asset 
heterogeneity is the source of illiquidity in the market. 
The seller sets a price on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If the visitor chooses to buy, the seller 
collects the sales price immediately.  If the visitor chooses not to buy the house, the house stays 
empty for this period and the seller tries to sell the house in the next period.   
Additionally, let q be the expected value of having a house on the market and let 
µ(p) be the probability that a house will sell when the list price is p.  The seller chooses a 
price to solve  
{ }q))p(1(p)p(maxq p βµµ −+=                              (1) 
The first part states that with probability µ the seller receives the asking price for the house.  The 
second part relates to the possibility of re-listing the house in the next period. The seller puts the 
house back on the market and tries to sell it again in the next period.  Here, the parameter β is a 
discount factor. 
The first order condition that gives the optimal price p is 
0)p()qp(
dp
d =+− µβµ     (2) 
The selling price of housing, p, and the expected value of having a house on the market, 
q, are determined in equations (1)–(2) in terms of µ, the probability of sale function.   
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We now consider the optimal behavior for the agent in his role as buyer.  We start first 
with an agent who currently has a “match” and will consume the housing service flow  λ at the 
beginning of the next period.  After this period, the homeowner will continue to consume λ if the 
match persists for another period, an event that happens with probability π.  If, on the other hand, 
the match fails, the agent must put the house on the market and begin to search again, an event 
that happens with probability 1 – π.   Define v(λ) to be the lifetime expected utility of owning a 
house yielding service flow λ, then 
))sq)(1()(()( +−++= πλπνλβλν                              (3) 
The first and the second part of the equation state that an agent will consume housing 
service flow with certainty for the first period and with the probability of π for the second period.  
The third part relates to the house selling process, which we saw above, yields q in expected 
value.  The agent also has an option to search for a new house at this point.  The value of this 
search option is represented by s.   
Under the optimal buy rule the agent buys the house with service flow λ for price p only 
if the expected value of the house net of price is greater than the option to search again next 
period.  That is, 
sp)( βλν ≥− .                                         (4) 
Since v is strictly increasing in λ and βs is constant, there exists a λ* such that a searching agent 
is indifferent between buying a house for the asking price p and searching again next period.  
That is, there exists an λ* such that  
sp*)( βλν =− .                                             (5) 
A buyer keeps searching if she draws λ< λ* and buys if she draws λ>λ*.  Therefore, we can 
write the expected value of search as 
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Here, the probability of sale is simply the probability of drawing λ>λ*.  Given that F is the 
uniform distribution on [0,1] so that µ = 1 – F(λ*), or 
*1 λµ −=      (7) 
The equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium: An equilibrium in which each agent’s 
decision rules are best responses to the same decision rules when adopted by other agents.  The 
equilibrium is a price of housing p, an expectation of the value of a house on the market q, an 
expectation of the outcome from the search process s, a reservation service flow λ*, and a belief 
about the probability that a buyer will purchase a house µ when the price is p. 52  All these 
variables must satisfy equations (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7).  These equations can be solved 
numerically.    
 In this model, optimal pricing implies that a house sells with probability less than one 
each time period.  The expected TOM is  
µ
µ−= 1TOM  .     (8) 
To evaluate what happens when the houses in the market have different amenity levels 
such as school quality attached to them, we redefine the housing service flow to consist of an 
idiosyncratic component λ and an aggregate component x, 
xd += λ .     (9) 
The idiosyncratic component λ has the same interpretation as before.  The state variable x is 
aggregate in that all agents who live in houses receive exactly the same x.  The variable x can 
                                                 
52 The proof for the existence of equilibrium can be found in Krainer and LeRoy (2002). 
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reflect the aggregate state of the economy such as employment growth and interest rates.  Under 
this interpretation, shocks to the productivity of the land or to job growth filter their way into 
house prices through x.  A more concrete interpretation of x could include amenity levels such as 
school quality or the level of crime in the area.  Under this interpretation, changes to a location-
specific component in the housing service that reflects the value of land filters into house price 
through x.  By adding a random variable x to the housing service flow, the equations above that 
define equilibrium become functions of x.  The main result of this model is the joint derivation of 
a probability of sale function µ(x) and a pricing function p(x).  The main proposition of the 
model is that the probability of sale, µ(p), differs  across states of x.  Krainer (1999) shows that 
the probability of sale is higher in the “high” state than it is in the “low” state.53 A second 
observation is that housing prices are also higher in the “high” state.   
Thus, we expect that houses located in higher quality school attendance areas show 
capitalization of school quality both in terms of prices and liquidity, where better schools lead to 
shorter selling times as well as higher house values. 54  
 
Empirical Methodology 
Many empirical studies have used log-linear regression models to estimate 
determinates of TOM (Belkin et al., 1976; Miller, 1978; Sirmans et al., 1991).  To 
capture the possibility that selling price and TOM are interactive variables, some studies 
have estimated simultaneous or two-stage models.  The complexity in this process arises 
                                                 
53 Krainer (1999) proves this proposition by assuming that the probability of sale is constant over x, and then derives 
a contradiction. This proof is presented in the Appendix D.    
54 For simplicity, assume that x is a random variable that can take on just two values, low and high.  In terms of 
school quality, high state can be viewed as school that receives an improved categorical ranking based on a student 
performance score.  
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because the specifications of both price and the TOM model are very similar, making it 
hard to identify separate equations. 
In a typical empirical study of housing market liquidity, the listing or selling 
prices along with the physical and location attributes of the house are on the right-hand 
side, and TOM is on the left hand side. The methodology of this study is a simultaneous 
system of a hedonic price model and a TOM model.  We use an approach developed in 
Turnbull and Dombrow (2006).  This approach allows us to extend the hedonic price 
model used in Chapter III by controlling for localized neighborhood market conditions, 
thereby eliminating the need to deal with the consequences of spatial correlation.  In our 
models, the log of sales price is explained by the marketing time, house characteristics, 
school characteristics, location, and housing market condition.  TOM is a function of the 
sales price, house characteristics, school characteristics, location, and housing market 
condition.  The different variables used to describe local housing market conditions 
ensure that both regression equations are identified in the 2SLS estimation.   
We modify the hedonic price function from the previous chapter to capture the 
simultaneity in price time relationship as follows:  
inktijktinkkt1inkt ZTOM)Pln( εΦωΓδβα ++++++=  
 inktijktinkktinkt2 Z)Pln(TOM εΦωΓδβα +′+++++=   (1) 
where Pinkt is the price of house i in neighborhood n in school k at time t. Zkt are the year-specific 
school level attributes, which include school district performance as measured by standard test 
scores and the socioeconomic and demographic composition of the students. Γink is a term that 
captures non-school time-invariant observable attributes of the unit including the neighborhood. 
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ijkΦ and ′ijkΦ are terms that capture neighborhood housing market conditions.  εinkt is a time-
variant unobservable that is assumed to be randomly distributed and uncorrelated with Zkt and 
Γink. ωt’s are the time fixed effects such as year, month and season that capture market 
conditions.   
We define the time-invariant unit attributes as a function of observed housing unit 
attributes (Xi) and neighborhood attributes (Wn). 
niink WX µβΓ +=     (2) 
Equation (2) assumes that unobserved unit and neighborhood attributes are uncorrelated with Xi 
as well as Wn.  This specification uses neighborhood controls based on the decennial census.  The 
estimating system of equations now becomes 
inktijktnikt1inkt WXZTOM)Pln( εΦωµβδβα +++++++=    
inktijktniktinkt2 WXZ)Pln(TOM εΦωµβδβα +′++++++=   (3) 
We also re-estimate our results by considering only those houses that are geographically 
close to the school attendance boundary.  We do this by rewriting equation (2) as  
biink KX φβΓ += ,    (4) 
where Kb is the vector of boundary dummies that represent the unique boundary that house i is 
associated with, the nearest school attendance boundary.  After incorporating this adjustment, the 
estimating system of equations becomes: 
           inktijktbikt1inkt KXZTOM)Pln( εΦωφβδβα +++++++=    
inktijktbiktinkt2 KXZ)Pln(TOM εΦωφβδβα +′++++++=  (5) 
The system of equations in (3) and (5) can be estimated using various methods including 
the instrumental variable approach (e.g., two- and three-stage least squares).  The different 
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elements in the neighborhood housing market conditions, vectors ijkΦ  and ′ijkΦ , ensure that both 
regression equations are identified in the 2SLS estimation.  The 2SLS estimates we report take 
into account the endogeneity of price and marketing time.  Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) 
present how spatial competition and externality effects can be applied to the housing market and 
therefore controls for the local housing market conditions are required in estimating price and 
TOM equations.  The basic idea is that the number of houses for sale in a small neighborhood 
surrounding a particular house can have localized effects on the distribution of prospective 
buyers and sellers.  A greater number of houses for sale increases the competition among sellers 
for buyers considering houses in the neighborhood.  Similarly, a greater number of houses for 
sale may draw more prospective buyers to the neighborhood, potentially increasing the chance of 
matching a particular house with a buyer.55   
Therefore, the sales price is explained in part by the concentration of competing listings 
in the neighborhood, listing density, LD, which is captured in vector ijkΦ .  The TOM equation 
uses a modified measure of localized competition, C, which is captured in vector ′ijkΦ .  
These measures for each house i are as follows: 
( )∑ +−
−=
1)i(l)i(s
)j,i(O)j,i(D1LD
2
   (4) 
( )∑ −= )j,i(O)j,i(D1C 2    (5) 
Here, l(i) and s(i) are the listing date and sales date for house i, respectively, so that TOM is now, 
s(i)-l(i)+1. Correspondingly, l(j) and s(j) are the listing date and sales date for house j. O(i,j) 
represents the overlapping TOM for contemporaneously listed houses i and j, and is defined as 
                                                 
55 For detailed discussion of spatial competition and shopping externalities in the housing market and the 
construction of the variables to capture those, see Turnbull and Dombrow (2006).   
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[ ] [ ] .1)j(l),i(lmax)j(s),i(smin)j,i(O +−=  D(i,j) is the distance in miles between houses i and 
j and it is calculated using the geocoded data.    
The calculations for these variables include all applicable competing house sales; that is, 
houses j within one mile of the house i.  These calculations are constructed to account for the 
number of days that competing houses actually overlap, weighted by the distance between them.  
The distance weighting is necessary to capture the belief that competing houses that are close by 
have stronger effects than houses that are farther away.  The calculations also include houses 
listed before and after our sample period that overlap with our sample period.  Following 
Turnbull and Dombrow (2006), a competing house is defined as one that is 20 percent larger or 
smaller in living area than the house for sale. 
In summary, we use the 2SLS to re-estimate the hedonic price models from Chapter III 
that examine the original establishment of the community sensitive attendance boundaries: the 
standard hedonic, system of equations (3); the attendance boundary fixed effects, system of 
equations (5); and one model that examines redistricting: the standard hedonic, system of 
equations (3). To analyze the effect of redistricting on housing values, we use the full sample of 
housing transactions from 1999 to 2002.  This specification is similar to using the system of 
equations (2) except that a new measure of school quality is added: change in school’s 
categorical ranking that is based on the school performance score.  Our simultaneous model of 
sales price and marketing time specifically controls for the effects of competition among nearby 
houses for sale.  
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Data 
In addition to variables described in Chapter III, we create six new variables that describe 
the neighborhood housing market.56 These are: listing density that measures the average intensity 
of competition (LD); competition measures the cumulative competition from other houses over 
the entire marketing time for a given house (competition);  new listing density/new competition 
is similar to the listing density/competition but only includes newly listed houses in its 
calculation (newLD/newCompetition); vacant listing density/vacant competition is similar to the 
listing density/competition but only includes competing vacant houses in its calculation (vacLD/ 
vacCompetition). 57  
Table 11 and Table 12 give the summary statistics over two time periods, 1994-1998 and 
1999-2002, of the variables that enter into the regression analysis.  The variables used to describe 
neighborhood housing market are under Neighborhood Market Conditions. These are indexes 
that measure concentration and competition of other listings in the neighborhood.   
 
                                                 
56 Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) suggest that these variables capture the effects of neighborhood market conditions 
because the number of houses for sale in a small neighborhood surrounding a particular house can have localized 
effects on potential buyers and sellers. A greater number of houses increases the competition among sellers for 
buyers who are searching in a particular neighborhood.  Similarly, a greater number of houses for sale in a particular 
neighborhood may draw more potential buyers increasing the likelihood of a match between a house and a buyer. 
57 Newly listed house is defined to be any house that has been listed for 14 days or less. 
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Table 11. Summary Statistics: 1994-1998 
Variable (Description) Number 
of Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent Variable      
      
soldprR (sold price in '99$) 10640 124812.2 57246.1 40000 358146.5
TOM (time-on-market) 10640 78.58111 63.20812 14 365
       
School Attributes       
test (percent passing CRCT) 7533 90.055 6.272 60.750 99.750
black_school (percent black in 
school) 
7533 0.505 0.240 0.067 1.000
lunch_school sq (percent on free 
lunch square) 
7533 0.479 0.211 0.066 0.944
       
House Attributes       
num_beds (number of bedrooms) 10640 3.277 0.632 1.000 6.000
fullbath (number of fullbath) 10640 2.041 0.484 1.000 4.000
livarea (living area in thousand sq. 
feet) 
10640 1.912 0.569 0.555 4.460
netarea (total area-living area) 10640 0.688 0.287 0.100 1.995
       
Tract Attributes       
ownerP (percent of owner occupied 
housing) 
10640 0.667 0.188 0.051 0.909
blackP (percent black in tract) 10640 0.225 0.238 0.010 0.984
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5) 10640 0.070 0.018 0.018 0.126
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17) 10640 0.185 0.042 0.032 0.326
medHH99 (median household 
income in thousand  '99$)   
10640 50.016 15.323 11.397 78.509
enrollP (percent enrolled in private 
schools) 
10640 0.052 0.083 0 0.373
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Table 11(continued). 
Variable (Description) Number 
of Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Neighborhood Market Conditions       
LD (Listing Density) 10640 3.654 2.666 0 18.797
newLD (New Listing Density) 10640 1.866 1.610 0 14.193
vacLD (Vacant Listing Density) 10640 0.565 1.145 0 10.481
competition (Competition) 10640 291.855 364.480 0 5206.805
newCompetition (New Competition) 10640 180.019 280.892 0 4868.132
vacCompetition (Vacant 
Competition) 
10640 47.6146 131.4766 0 2364.172
a School averages are calculated using only houses sold after the publication of the Consent 
Decree document containing school attendance zones.  These cover sales made after June, 1996. 
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Table 12. Summary Statistics: 1999-2002 
Variable (Description) Number 
of Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent Variable      
      
soldprR (sold price in '99$) 6414 129283.6 54784.23 40000 320000
tom (time-on-market) 6414 68.608 44.559 14.000 180
      
School Attributes      
sps Improve (school improved 
rating) 
6414 0.188 0.390 0 1.000
sps Worse (school lowered rating) 6414 0.061 0.240 0 1.000
reassign (reassignment dummy) 6414 0.126 0.332 0 1.000
blackChange (change in percent 
black in school)  
6414 0.051 0.082 -0.183 0.666
freelunchChange (change in percent 
on free lunch) 
6414 0.060 0.067 -0.216 0.381
      
House Attributes      
num_beds (number of bedrooms) 6414 3.232 0.626 1.000 5.000
fullbath (number of fullbath) 6414 2.024 0.503 1.000 5.000
livarea (living area in thousand sq. 
feet) 
6414 1.870 0.545 0.703 4.435
netarea (total area-living area) 6414 0.675 0.282 0.110 1.995
      
Tract Attributes      
blackP (percent black in tract) 6414 0.208 0.231 0.010 0.984
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5) 6414 0.069 0.018 0.018 0.126
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17) 6414 0.184 0.042 0.032 0.326
medHH99 (median household 
income in thousand '99$) 
6414 50.331 14.774 11.397 78.509
enrollP (percent enrolled in private 
schools) 
6414 0.054 0.084 0 0.373
      
Neighborhood Market Conditions      
LD (Listing Density) 6414 3.798 2.494 0 18.302
newLD (New Listing Density) 6414 1.739 1.446 0 11.306
vacLD (Vacant Listing Density) 6414 1.875 1.724 0 13.600
competition (Competition) 6414 263.677 277.029 0 2727.606
newCompetition (New Competition) 6414 141.995 187.771 0 1724.786
vacCompetition (Vacant 
Competition) 
6414 133.419 182.757 0 1985.733
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Results 
This section reviews some of the key results from different sample areas and is based on 
the previously described empirical models.  Our findings based on original school assignments 
are reported in Table 13, while Table 14 reports our findings based on school reassignments.  
These results combine to suggest that there is a statistical link between marketing time and 
school quality variables.  More comprehensive results are presented below.  
Table 13 presents the key results of the school quality parameter estimates for the pooled 
sample (1994-1998) and the boundary sample.  The first two columns, labeled specification (1), 
show the price equation and the TOM equation estimates from 2SLS analysis and neighborhood 
controls drawn from census tract variables when we consider only the impact of test scores, test.  
We then expand the model by adding other variables that describe student bodies’ 
socioeconomic characteristics.  The final two columns, labeled specification (4) in Table 13, 
show 2SLS results using boundary fixed effects in the price equation.  For this analysis, we 
determine the attendance boundaries for 60 elementary schools in East Baton Rouge Parish.  We 
follow Black (1999) and select only houses within a 0.35 mile buffer of the attendance boundary.  
In this restricted sample there are 6,801 single family residences. The discussion that follows 
refers to the results under specification (3) for the full sample and specification (4) for our 
boundary sample.  
The variables under School Attributes are the main variables of interest here.  The 
coefficient on the test scores in the price equation appears statistically insignificant across both 
samples.  However, in both models, we find that increasing test scores in a neighborhood school 
results in shorter marketing time for houses in those attendance zones.  Furthermore, the test 
score coefficient in the TOM equation in our full sample, specification (3), suggests that 
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increasing the test scores by one standard deviation, for the given selling price, above the mean 
reduces marketing time by about two days, or just over 2.5 percent of average marketing time.58  
No other school variable appears significant in the TOM equation in our full sample.   
Looking at the boundary sample, specification (4) in the Table 13, all three of the school 
variables in the TOM equation are significant.   The level of significance varies from 1 percent 
for students receiving free lunch to 10 percent for school racial composition. The coefficients on 
these variables imply that higher test scores are associated with a shorter marketing time of a 
little over three days for an increase in one standard deviation at the mean; higher percent black 
in school is associated with a longer marketing time of about four days for an increase in one 
standard deviation at the mean; and higher percent on free lunch is associated with a shorter 
marketing time of about seven days for an increase in one standard deviation at the mean.  In 
addition, our boundary sample results using the simultaneous system indicate that the 
representation of blacks in local public schools has no effect on property values after controlling 
directly for test scores.59 
Another interesting result concerns the percent of school-age children enrolled in private 
schools.  Recall, that in the hedonic price equation of Chapter III, we see that the coefficient on 
this variable is negative, indicating a negative effect on property values, possibly because some 
houses must be sold at discounted prices to capture the cost of private education.  This result is 
consistent across both full and boundary samples, price equation in specifications (3) and (4) in 
Table 13, and it shows that one standard deviation increase in the percent enrollment in private 
schools is associated with about a 0.64 percent decrease in housing prices.  When looking at the 
                                                 
58 Seven percent of our sample has percent passing CRCT of 96.33 or higher. 
59 Recall that the coefficient on the representation of blacks in local public schools was positive and significant at 10 
percent in our hedonic price equation from the Chapter III. 
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Table 13. 2SLS Regression Results 1994-1998 full sample:  
Endogenous Variables: ln(sold price in ‘99$) 
TOM (time-on-market in days) 
 (1)  (2)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
     
tom -0.000293***  -0.000293***  
 (0.000040)  (0.000040)  
lnsoldprR  -15.59***  -15.27*** 
  (3.62)  (3.62) 
     
School Attributes     
test 0.000296 -0.0831 0.000198 -0.284** 
 (0.00037) (0.10) (0.00050) (0.14) 
black_school   -0.00426 -8.619** 
   (0.014) (3.90) 
Lunch_school     
     
     
Observations 10640 10640 10640 10640 
R-squared 0.87 0.55 0.87 0.55 
Fixed Effects     
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous 
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP, 
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition, 
vacCompetition.  
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and 
month sold. Complete model estimates presented in the Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101
 
Table 13 (continued). 
 (3)  (4)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
     
tom -0.000293***  -0.000273***  
 (0.000040)  (0.000048)  
lnsoldprR  -15.87***  -12.92*** 
  (3.63)  (4.60) 
     
School Attributes     
test -0.000200 -0.358** 0.000671 -0.508** 
 (0.00053) (0.15) (0.00074) (0.20) 
black_school 0.0362 -0.790 0.0400 17.84* 
 (0.024) (6.56) (0.039) (10.4) 
Lunch_school -0.0593** -11.38 -0.0312 -33.56*** 
 (0.028) (7.68) (0.046) (12.4) 
     
Observations 10640 10640 6801 6801 
R-squared 0.87 0.55 0.88 0.60 
Fixed Effects   Boundary Boundary 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous 
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP, 
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition, 
vacCompetition. 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and 
month sold. Complete model estimates presented in the Appendix B. 
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boundary fixed effects regression, specification (4), the coefficient suggests even larger impact 
of private schools enrollment, about 1.85 percent.  The TOM equation shows that the coefficient 
on this variable is again negative, indicative of shorter marketing time for those houses.  This 
result is consistent across both specifications and it shows that for a given house selling price, 
one standard deviation increase in the enrollment in private schools in a census tract is associated 
with about 2 days shorter marketing time in our full sample, and about 3 days in our boundary 
sample.  Increase in the private enrollment could be capturing additional options of private 
education. The availability of these options could make some locations more desirable increasing 
a probability of receiving an offer at any given time.   
Our results show that housing comparables enter the house pricing equation with the 
expected sign.  Increases in the living area, net area and the number of bathrooms increase the 
price of a house, on average.  The coefficient on TOM variable that measures time-on-market is 
consistently negative and significant at a 1percent level in both samples.  At the same time, the 
TOM equation estimates show that increases in the living area (livarea) and number of 
bathrooms (fullbath), while holding the size of the house constant, are associated with longer 
marketing time.   
 The results in Table 13 yield some interesting observations about Neighborhood Market 
Conditions.  We show that vacant listing density, vacLD, enters the price equation with a 
negative sign and it is significant at a 1 percent level.  Consistent with Turnbull and Dombrow 
(2006), this result suggests that a greater number of houses for sale in the neighborhood increases 
the competition for potential buyers and reduces the likelihood of a match between a given house 
and a potential buyer who is willing to offer more for that particular house.  Looking at 
marketing time in our boundary sample, the TOM equation, specification (4), we note positive 
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and significant coefficients on all three competition variables indicating that having more houses 
for sale in the neighborhood surrounding a given house lengthens the time it takes to sell that 
house for a given price, other things equal. 
Table 14 reports our findings based on school reassignments.  The first two columns, 
labeled specification (1) in the Table 14, show the price equation and the TOM equation 
estimates from 2SLS analysis and neighborhood controls drawn from census tract variables when 
we consider only the impact of change in categorical ranking and reassignments. We, then, 
expend the model by adding other variables that capture student body’s socioeconomic 
characteristics.  As reported earlier, selling price is a function of days on the market, school 
attributes, house characteristics, location attributes, broad market conditions, and neighborhood 
housing market conditions.  Similarly, the TOM equation is a function of selling price, school 
attributes, house characteristics, location attributes, broad market conditions, and competition 
that captures neighborhood housing market conditions. The reported 2SLS estimates take into 
account the endogeneity of price and marketing time.  The base group consists of houses that are 
in the school attendance areas that have not changed their categorical ranking and have not been 
re-assigned.   
We focus our attention to the coefficients of variables under School Attributes. Instead of 
test scores, we use a set of binary variables (SPS Improve, SPS Worse) that is equal to one if the 
house is in the school attendance zone that has a positive/negative change to its categorical 
performance measure.  Many schools in the EBRSS have been low performing schools and we 
have a reason to believe that buyers might be interested in trends in school quality. 
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Table 14. 2SLS Regression Results 1999-2002: Endogenous Variables:  
ln(sold price in ‘99$) 
TOM (time-on-market in days) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
       
TOM -0.0000592  -0.0000494  -0.0000482  
 (0.000065)  (0.000065)  (0.000065)  
lnsoldprR  -1.706  -3.677  -4.022 
  (3.39)  (3.41)  (3.42) 
       
School Attributes       
Sps Improve 0.0419*** 2.366** 0.0532*** 4.536*** 0.0528*** 4.463*** 
 (0.0056) (1.09) (0.0060) (1.19) (0.0060) (1.19) 
Sps Worse 0.00798 11.59*** -0.00301 9.587*** 0.000160 10.47*** 
 (0.0086) (1.70) (0.0089) (1.76) (0.0091) (1.79) 
BlackChange   0.165*** 29.69*** 0.242*** 51.69*** 
   (0.033) (6.58) (0.056) (11.1) 
freelunchChange     -0.107* -30.76** 
     (0.062) (12.4) 
reassign 0.00854 -3.181*** 0.00919 -2.998** 0.00825 -3.249***
 (0.0060) (1.20) (0.0060) (1.19) (0.0060) (1.20) 
       
       
Constant 10.82*** 62.35* 10.82*** 83.62** 10.82*** 88.24** 
 (0.024) (35.8) (0.024) (36.0) (0.024) (36.1) 
Observations 6414 6414 6414 6414 6414 6414 
R-squared 0.86 0.55 0.86 0.55 0.86 0.55 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous variables: sps 
Improve, sps Worse, blackChange, freelunchChange, reassign, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, 
medHH99, enrollP, num_beds, f_bath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, 
newCompetition, vacCompetition. 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and 
month sold. Complete model estimates presented in the Appendix B. 
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Using these variables allows us to look into not just short-term fluctuations in test scores 
but also longer-term progress.  We also use another binary variable that captures the change in 
reassignments, reassign, that it is equal to one if the house has been reassigned to a different 
school after the change in attendance boundaries in 2001.  Recall that our results using the 
hedonic price function of Chapter III indicate that holding other factors fixed, an improvement in 
the categorical ranking of school performance is associated with a 5 percent increase in housing 
prices.  On the other hand, we find no penalty for schools that see a decline in their categorical 
ranking.  However, when we re-examine schools’ categorical rankings on simultaneous 
determination of selling price and time-on-market, we note that houses located in the school 
attendance areas that have changed their categorical ranking are also sold after longer marketing 
time.  Referring to the results reported in the specification (3) in the Table 14, a decline in 
categorical ranking is predicted to lengthen the marketing time by 10 days.  Interestingly, the 
houses that are associated with schools that have an improved categorical ranking also see longer 
marketing times by about four days.  Yet, at the given selling price, if the house is reassigned to a 
different school its marketing time is shorter by three days relative to a house that is not 
reassigned.  
One possible explanation is that reassignments affected mostly houses that belonged to 
the attendance areas of previously overcrowded schools.  Thus, the reassignment would indicate 
that children are now placed in less congested schools.   
Our findings, once again, suggest that the representation of blacks in local public schools 
leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for any changes in the school 
categorical rankings.  An increase of one standard deviation in percentage point black in a school 
is associated with an increase of 1.9 percent in the house price, at the mean.  At the same time, 
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for a given selling price, the TOM equation shows changes in percentage point blacks in a school 
by one standard deviation, or about 8 percent, are associated with longer marketing time, about 4 
days, at the mean.   
Consistent with the analysis based on the original school assignments, we again show that 
housing comparables enter the house pricing equation with the expected sign.  Increases in the 
living area, net area and the number of bathrooms increase the price of a house, on average.   
The results in Table 14 reinforce earlier conclusions about Neighborhood Market 
Conditions.  Here, we show that vacant listing density, vacLD, and new listing density, newLD,  
enter the price equation with negative signs and the coefficients are significant at a 1 percent 
level.  Consistent with Turnbull and Dombrow (2006), this result suggests that a greater number 
of newly listed and vacant houses for sale in the neighborhood increases the competition for 
potential buyers and reduces the likelihood of a match between a given house and a potential 
buyer who is willing to offer more for that particular house.  Looking at marketing time, the 
TOM equation in the specification (3) in the Table 14, we note positive and significant 
coefficients on all but vacant competition variables, indicating that having more houses for sale 
in the neighborhood surrounding a given house lengthens the time it takes to sell that house for a 
given price, other things equal. 
 
Conclusion 
Hedonic value models have long been used in attempts to quantify the social 
benefits/costs of locational amenities/disamenities.  Most early hedonic studies employ cross-
sectional data, or at least data on a large number of housing transactions occurring over a 
relatively short period of time to evaluate how changes in local amenities are reflected in house 
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prices.  The main assumption is that change in a local amenity reflects a change in a fundamental 
value of an asset and is transmitted to the market through prices.  In most models of asset prices, 
time to sale is precisely zero.  The real estate market does not appear to work this way.  Krainer 
(1999)shows that when the fundamental value of housing services changes, this change is 
accompanied by a smaller change in a house price.  Liquidity adjusts to make up the difference.  
In another words, when house values decline, sellers are slow to drop their prices.  In turn, 
marketing time increases.60   
We use a search model of the real estate market where prices and liquidity are determined 
endogenously to show that when the value of housing services flows, neighborhood school 
quality, is allowed to fluctuate, liquidity also fluctuates.  For example, the model states that when 
school quality is low, sellers do not necessarily drop their prices.  Rather, prices are sticky 
because sellers find it optimal to search for a buyer who attaches high value to the house based 
on other comparables.   
Using the data from East Baton Rouge Parish, we investigate school quality variables’ 
impact on the liquidity of the housing market through the housing service flow as recognized in 
the theoretical model.  We establish a statistical link between TOM and many neighborhood 
market conditions.  
For example, our analysis of original school assignment using the full sample shows no 
statistical significance of any school variable but test scores in the TOM equation.  Once we 
focus on estimating differences in housing price effects near attendance zone boundaries we note 
                                                 
60 Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner and Haurin (2003) argue that slower relative reaction of sellers to changing market 
conditions explains the relationship between prices and liquidity.  The traditional explanation (Case & Shiller, 2003; 
Genesove & Mayer, 1997) is that sellers “irrationally” refuse to recognize the decline in the value of their properties 
and continue to wait for higher than market values. Another explanation (Genesove and Mayer, 1997) is based on 
house sellers’ equity constraints.  
108
 
a stronger relationship between TOM and school variables.  The results imply that higher test 
scores are associated with shorter marketing time; higher percent black in school is associated 
with longer marketing time; and higher percent on free lunch is associated with shorter 
marketing time.   
In summary, we find statistical support to earlier research on a tradeoff between an 
acceptable price and the time a seller has a house on the market.  Our empirical results show that 
selling price declines with longer marketing time.  Furthermore, we find statistical evidence that 
the differences in transactions prices do not capture all of the differences in locational attributes.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
For many families with children, the most important factor they consider when buying a 
house is that of school quality. The value homebuyers place on the education of their children 
can be reveled by examining how much more people pay for houses in areas with better schools.  
Does the quest for high-quality schools have a significant effect on house prices?  Which school 
characteristics do parents find most important when examining school quality?  To answer these 
questions, this dissertation used a unique data set from East Baton Rouge Parish school system in 
Louisiana to provide the first empirical study that considers the impact of changes in school 
quality on simultaneous determination of selling price and time-on-market.  
The end to EBRPSS’s 47-year school desegregation case provided a rare opportunity to 
study how a sudden exogenous change in public policy impacts the housing market. The end of 
random school assignments and introduction of neighborhood schools followed by the 
redistricting implemented by EBRPSS are a natural experiment in education policy.  The school 
district was operating under a court-imposed desegregation order.  This desegregation order 
caused changes in the housing market locational amenities in the form of test scores and school 
demographic composition.  Such exogenous change allowed us to use classical statistical theory 
that works only if variations in data occur randomly.  The uniqueness of our data set and 
empirical methodology avoid common difficulties in housing market studies.  While looking 
within one school district enabled us to eliminate variations in property tax rates, school 
spending, and other public services, two different sources of variation along boundaries of school 
attendance zones and following the change in school assignments provided for an ideal situation 
to study the effects of school quality measures and racial composition on housing prices.  
Similarly, controls for the localized housing market supply and demand conditions ensured that 
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price and time-on-market equations are identified in the 2SLS estimation, and removed a 
potential source of spatial correlation in housing data.  
In the second chapter, we described EBRPSS’s 88 schools and gave a brief history of the 
school system’s battle with  desegregation law suits from 1956 to 2003.  In 1981, U.S. District 
Judge John Parker designed and ordered a desegregation plan that led quickly to a mass flight of 
8,000 white students with many more to follow, which further complicated the desegregation 
plan. What was once a majority white school system, became a majority black school system. 
Due to these events, the school system changed dramatically as it operated under random school 
assignments. The 1996 Consent Decree eliminated random school assignments and created new 
“community sensitive” attendance zones. These events provided a rare opportunity to study the 
impact of changes in school assignments and school quality as measured by test scores, and 
racial composition on housing prices and time-on-market. 
In the third chapter, we used the hedonic price model and conventional capitalization 
theory to measure the value of better schools. We followed Black’s (1999) approach and used the 
boundary fixed effects technique to minimize the likelihood that omitted neighborhood 
characteristics are driving the results of the estimation.  We also considered the impact of peers 
and included variables such as school racial composition and percent of students on free-lunch.  
The housing market reveals that the type of grading system used or the indicators of quality can 
have a large effect on property values.  For example, our findings based on the initial school 
assignments show that the housing market does not seem to be sensitive to increases in test 
scores. On the other hand, our examination of school categorical rankings indicate that, holding 
other factors fixed, an improvement in categorical ranking of school performance is associated 
with a 5.61 percent increase in housing prices.  At the same time, we observe no penalty for 
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schools that see a decline in their categorical ranking.   Furthermore, our study indicates that in 
considering a neighborhood with a less elastic supply of housing, concentrated mostly in a 
central city, the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 7.8 percent 
increase in the house price.  At the mean, this is equivalent to $9,227 (the mean house price in 
this sub-sample is $118,300).  Similarly, there is a penalty equivalent to a 5.5 percent of house 
price associated with houses in the schools that saw a decrease in their categorical ranking 
relative to those houses that saw no change in their school rankings.  This result implies that 
central city house values are more elastic with respect to improvements in elementary school 
categorical rankings.  Thus, improving elementary schools has a great potential for increasing 
house values, and, as a consequence, revenue from property taxes. 
In the fourth chapter, we called attention to the problem of readjustment to the 
equilibrium following some environmental shock.   In the short run, the supply of owner 
occupied housing is fixed and the market response to demand shocks should be symmetric: 
positive shocks result in price increases and negative shocks result in price decreases.  However, 
housing markets typically respond to large negative demand shocks with long periods during 
which asset liquidity declines but house prices change relatively little.  Thus, we accounted for 
the simultaneity of the time-price relationship by using the 2SLS to re-estimate the hedonic price 
models from the third chapter.   
Using the data from East Baton Rouge Parish, we investigated how school quality 
impacts the liquidity of the housing market, through the housing service flow as established in 
the theoretical model.  The empirical evidence produced by this study indicates that there is state 
dependant illiquidity.  Of course, the empirical evidence offered here is relevant to only one 
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housing market.  Future research could focus on the impact of school quality on simultaneous 
determination of selling price and time-on-market in the different metropolitan areas.  
Two main areas for additional research concern school quality measures and time-on-
market.  Given the unique data, future research needs to incorporate the availability of 
intradistrict school choice.  For example, the availability of choice programs contributes to 
underestimation of school quality capitalization since it gives parents living outside of their 
desired school attendance area the choice to send their child to any school within the school 
district.  Similarly, when attendance boundaries were first determined, the district made every 
“reasonable good-faith effort” to desegregate the system while considering the size of the school, 
the distribution of students by grade level, natural boundaries, and, in some cases, family 
economics and neighborhoods.  However, the original boundaries were not meeting the 
requirements spelled in the Consent Decree of 1996 and were redrawn in 2001.  As a result of 
reassignments some students do not attend schools 
closest to their neighborhoods.  Future research needs to investigate the impact of distance to the 
elementary school.61   
It is possible to argue that the house and neighborhood characteristics collected in this 
dataset are not the most important characteristics.  A different set of characteristics, such as 
nearby amenities, influence price and liquidity, but remain unobservable to the researcher.  The 
same exercise can be repeated using a different amenity such as the level of crime in the area.  In 
addition, study can be extended across time to determine if the results generated here are stable 
in different market conditions.   
                                                 
61 Kane et al. (2003) find that an additional mile in distance from the elementary school was associated with a 1 to 5 
percentage point decline in housing values.  This outcome is equivalent to the effect associated with one standard 
deviation difference in test scores. 
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Finally, a critique of our empirical work is due to non-normality of the marketing time 
duration distribution, since duration is positive by construct. An empirical method that 
circumvents this problem is survival regression, or duration analysis. The significant difference 
between the OLS and survival regression is that a researcher is allowed to select a distribution 
for the error term in survival regression.  The exponential or Weibull distributions are usually 
chosen for this application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114
 
Appendix A: Attendance District Boundaries 
The most important feature of attendance boundaries that make them useful for this 
estimation is that they are unchanging.  The existence of this feature is what homeowners use 
when forming their expectations about the local school.  It is plausible that, since the attendance 
boundaries were drawn in August of 1996, EBR homeowners do not have enough time to 
evaluate the information about local schools and include that information in their pricing 
decisions.  Similarly, according to school district administrators, when attendance boundaries 
were first determined, the district made every “reasonable good-faith effort” to desegregate the 
system while considering the size of the school, the distribution of students by grade level, 
natural boundaries, and, in some cases, family economics and neighborhoods.  Anecdotal 
evidence points that the boundaries, once drawn, were not meeting the requirements spelled in 
the Consent Decree and needed to be redrawn. For example, on September 27, 1996, shortly 
after the Decree was implemented, The Board sought permission to exceed the proposed 
enrollment in 17 schools. Similar motions were filed on September 24, 1997 and October 23, 
1998.  It became apparent that the Board will have to redraw the boundaries in order to comply 
with Consent Decree requirements. We use this implication of instability of the boundary sample 
and look at the school quality capitalization while excluding the boundary sample. There are 
3,835 observations in this sample. The mean house value in this sample is $129,169.  Table A1 
reports parameter estimates on key variables. Even after such an exercise, we do not find any 
evidence of test score capitalization.  
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Table A1. Regression Results Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ‘99$) 
 (1)BASELINE 
HEDONIC 
(2)BASELINE 
HEDONIC 
Regressors Neighborhood 
Controls from 
Census Tracts 
Neighborhood 
Controls from Local 
Market Conditions 
   
test -0.00169 -0.00164 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
black_school -0.0309 -0.0358 
 (0.046) (0.047) 
Lunch_school -0.00713 -0.00329 
 (0.054) (0.056) 
Observations 3835 3835 
R-squared 0.88 0.88 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are not 
reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes, house age, mls area, year 
and season sold. 
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Appendix B: Regression Results with Complete Estimates 
Table B1. Regression Results: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is New Construction in the 
Census Tract, 1994-1998  
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $) 
 (1)FULL 
SAMPLE 
(2) NEW 
HOUSING <.25 
(3) NEW 
HOUSING >=.25 
Regressors lnsoldprR lnsoldprR lnsoldprR 
    
School Attributes    
Test  -0.000246 -0.00112 0.000250 
 (0.00061) (0.00069) (0.0011) 
black_school  0.0362 -0.0208 0.249*** 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.040) 
lunch_school  -0.0629** -0.0541 -0.125** 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.051) 
    
House Attributes    
TOM  -0.000253*** -0.000284*** -0.000194*** 
 (0.000027) (0.000034) (0.000040) 
num_beds  0.00143 0.00485 0.00287 
 (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0068) 
Fullbath 0.0194*** 0.0280*** -0.00674 
 (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0084) 
Livarea  0.472*** 0.432*** 0.548*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0075) (0.012) 
Netarea  0.151*** 0.142*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.016) 
    
Tract Attributes    
ownerP  -0.0997*** -0.129*** -0.173*** 
 (0.017) (0.030) (0.049) 
blackP  0.0135 0.0571*** -0.295*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.054) 
kidsP1  0.115 0.0184 -0.467 
 (0.13) (0.25) (0.49) 
kidsP2  -0.487*** -0.897*** 0.939*** 
 (0.079) (0.11) (0.35) 
medHH99  0.00502*** 0.00640*** -0.000124 
 (0.00033) (0.00057) (0.00073) 
enrollP -0.0741*** -0.133*** 0.00532 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.073) 
Constant 10.70*** 10.78*** 10.75*** 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.041) 
Observations 10640 7171 3469 
R-squared 0.87 0.85 0.91 
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Table B2.  Regression Results: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is New Construction in the 
Census Tract, 1999-2002  
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $) 
 
 
(1) FULL 
SAMPLE 
(2) NEW HOUSING 
<.25 
(3) NEW HOUSING 
>=.25 
Regressors lnsoldprR lnsoldprR lnsoldprR 
School 
Attributes 
   
sps Improve  0.0516*** 0.0779*** 0.0583*** 
 (0.0070) (0.011) (0.022) 
sps Worse  -0.000666 -0.0548*** 0.0126 
 (0.0093) (0.017) (0.012) 
blackChange  0.222*** 0.474*** -0.488** 
 (0.058) (0.088) (0.25) 
freelunchChange  -0.0948 -0.193** -0.337 
 (0.061) (0.077) (0.54) 
Reassign  0.00940* 0.0226*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0071) (0.053) 
    
Tract Attributes    
blackP  0.0136 0.0917*** -0.358*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.063) 
kidsP1 0.275 0.122 0.868 
 (0.17) (0.31) (0.65) 
kidsP2  -0.406*** -0.791*** 0.0274 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.29) 
medHH99  0.00398*** 0.00548*** -0.00262*** 
 (0.00034) (0.00045) (0.00061) 
enrollP  -0.00994 -0.0617 0.688*** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.11) 
    
House Attributes    
TOM  -0.000163*** -0.000185*** -0.0000884 
 (0.000045) (0.000055) (0.000065) 
num_beds  0.00236 0.00289 0.00485 
 (0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0100) 
Fullbath  0.0274*** 0.0318*** 0.0145 
 (0.0066) (0.0076) (0.012) 
Livarea  0.426*** 0.413*** 0.432*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0098) (0.016) 
Netarea  0.135*** 0.128*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0099) (0.011) (0.020) 
Constant 10.82*** 10.82*** 11.12*** 
 (0.025) (0.042) (0.068) 
Observations 6414 4544 1870 
R-squared 0.86 0.84 0.91 
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Table B3.  2SLS Regression Results 1994-1998: Endogenous Variables: 
 ln(sold price in ‘99$)  
TOM (time-on-market in days) 
 (1)  (2)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
     
tom -0.000293***  -0.000293***  
 (0.000040)  (0.000040)  
lnsoldprR  -15.59***  -15.27*** 
  (3.62)  (3.62) 
School Attributes     
test 0.000296 -0.0831 0.000198 -0.284** 
 (0.00037) (0.10) (0.00050) (0.14) 
black_school   -0.00426 -8.619** 
   (0.014) (3.90) 
Lunch_school     
House Attributes     
num_beds 0.00170 -1.291 0.00168 -1.330 
 (0.0035) (0.95) (0.0035) (0.95) 
fullbath 0.0192*** 4.211*** 0.0192*** 4.174*** 
 (0.0042) (1.15) (0.0042) (1.15) 
livarea 0.471*** 21.14*** 0.471*** 21.07*** 
 (0.0048) (2.07) (0.0048) (2.07) 
netarea 0.151*** -4.674** 0.151*** -4.800** 
 (0.0065) (1.88) (0.0065) (1.88) 
Tract Attributes     
ownerP -0.0968*** -10.98** -0.0963*** -9.931** 
 (0.017) (4.63) (0.017) (4.65) 
blackP 0.0186 -11.98*** 0.0201 -8.810** 
 (0.015) (4.00) (0.016) (4.25) 
kidsP1 0.128 -25.97 0.125 -31.36 
 (0.13) (34.9) (0.13) (35.0) 
kidsP2 -0.506*** 73.92*** -0.510*** 65.84*** 
 (0.074) (20.4) (0.076) (20.8) 
medHH99 0.00513*** -0.250*** 0.00513*** -0.238*** 
 (0.00030) (0.084) (0.00030) (0.084) 
enrollP -0.0771*** -18.98*** -0.0766*** -18.04*** 
 (0.021) (5.74) (0.021) (5.76) 
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Table B3 (continued).   
 (1)  (2)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
     
Neighborhood Market Conditions     
LD -0.00162  -0.00162  
 (0.0013)  (0.0013)  
newLD 0.00261  0.00262  
 (0.0021)  (0.0021)  
vacLD -0.00667***  -0.00664***  
 (0.0019)  (0.0019)  
competition  -0.00744*  -0.00724* 
  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
newCompetition  0.169***  0.169*** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0052) 
vacCompetition  0.0511***  0.0512*** 
  (0.0039)  (0.0039) 
     
Constant 10.74*** 199.6*** 10.74*** 195.9*** 
 (0.019) (37.8) (0.019) (37.8) 
Observations 10640 10640 10640 10640 
R-squared 0.87 0.55 0.87 0.55 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous 
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP, 
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition, 
vacCompetition. 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and 
month sold.  
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Table B4.  2SLS Regression Results 1994-1998: Endogenous Variables: 
 ln(sold price in ‘99$)  
TOM (time-on-market in days) 
 (3)  (4)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
     
Tom -0.000293***  -0.000273***  
 (0.000040)  (0.000048)  
lnsoldprR  -15.87***  -12.92*** 
  (3.63)  (4.60) 
     
School Attributes     
Test -0.000200 -0.358** 0.000671 -0.508** 
 (0.00053) (0.15) (0.00074) (0.20) 
black_school 0.0362 -0.790 0.0400 17.84* 
 (0.024) (6.56) (0.039) (10.4) 
Lunch_school -0.0593** -11.38 -0.0312 -33.56*** 
 (0.028) (7.68) (0.046) (12.4) 
     
House Attributes     
num_beds 0.00160 -1.338 0.0198*** 0.693 
 (0.0035) (0.95) (0.0043) (1.15) 
Fullbath 0.0194*** 4.231*** 0.00634 3.455** 
 (0.0042) (1.15) (0.0051) (1.35) 
Livarea 0.472*** 21.36*** 0.449*** 17.09*** 
 (0.0048) (2.07) (0.0060) (2.53) 
Netarea 0.151*** -4.735** 0.149*** -3.865* 
 (0.0065) (1.88) (0.0079) (2.27) 
     
Tract Attributes     
ownerP -0.101*** -10.82** -0.260*** 5.919 
 (0.017) (4.69) (0.026) (6.98) 
blackP 0.0120 -10.30** 0.00443 5.728 
 (0.016) (4.36) (0.029) (7.81) 
kidsP1 0.141 -27.64 -0.232 56.89 
 (0.13) (35.0) (0.23) (61.0) 
kidsP2 -0.502*** 66.64*** -0.0135 5.280 
 (0.076) (20.8) (0.13) (34.5) 
medHH99 0.00507*** -0.247*** 0.00616*** -0.138 
 (0.00030) (0.084) (0.00042) (0.12) 
enrollP -0.0765*** -18.06*** -0.127*** -33.01*** 
 (0.021) (5.76) (0.029) (7.74) 
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Table B4 (continued).   
 (3)  (4)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
     
Neighborhood Market Conditions      
LD -0.00146  0.000227  
 (0.0013)  (0.0016)  
newLD 0.00258  0.00121  
 (0.0021)  (0.0026)  
vacLD -0.00665***  -0.0131***  
 (0.0019)  (0.0025)  
Competition  -0.00695*  0.0211*** 
  (0.0042)  (0.0052) 
newCompetition  0.168***  0.142*** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0064) 
vacCompetition  0.0512***  0.0553*** 
  (0.0039)  (0.0051) 
     
Constant 10.74*** 203.1*** 10.78*** 118.9* 
 (0.019) (37.9) (0.16) (64.7) 
Observations 10640 10640 6801 6801 
R-squared 0.87 0.55 0.88 0.60 
     
Fixed Effects   Boundary Boundary 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous 
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP, 
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition, 
vacCompetition. 
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and 
month sold.  
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Table B5.  2SLS Regression Results 1999-2002: Endogenous Variables:  
ln(sold price in ‘99$) 
TOM (time-on-market in days) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
       
TOM -0.0000592  -0.0000494  -0.0000482  
 (0.000065)  (0.000065)  (0.000065)  
lnsoldprR  -1.706  -3.677  -4.022 
  (3.39)  (3.41)  (3.42) 
       
School Attributes       
Sps Improve 0.0419*** 2.366** 0.0532*** 4.536*** 0.0528*** 4.463*** 
 (0.0056) (1.09) (0.0060) (1.19) (0.0060) (1.19) 
Sps Worse 0.00798 11.59*** -0.00301 9.587*** 0.000160 10.47*** 
 (0.0086) (1.70) (0.0089) (1.76) (0.0091) (1.79) 
BlackChange   0.165*** 29.69*** 0.242*** 51.69*** 
   (0.033) (6.58) (0.056) (11.1) 
freelunchChange     -0.107* -30.76** 
     (0.062) (12.4) 
reassign 0.00854 -3.181*** 0.00919 -2.998** 0.00825 -3.249*** 
 (0.0060) (1.20) (0.0060) (1.19) (0.0060) (1.20) 
       
House Attributes       
num_beds 0.00320 -1.358 0.00263 -1.439* 0.00211 -1.584* 
 (0.0043) (0.86) (0.0043) (0.86) (0.0044) (0.86) 
f_bath 0.0274*** -1.430 0.0274*** -1.368 0.0277*** -1.264 
 (0.0052) (1.04) (0.0051) (1.04) (0.0051) (1.04) 
livarea 0.424*** 9.111*** 0.425*** 9.991*** 0.425*** 10.23*** 
 (0.0062) (1.79) (0.0061) (1.80) (0.0061) (1.80) 
netarea 0.137*** -1.898 0.136*** -1.766 0.136*** -1.734 
 (0.0081) (1.70) (0.0081) (1.70) (0.0081) (1.70) 
       
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous variables: sps 
Improve, sps Worse, blackChange, freelunchChange, reassign, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, 
medHH99, enrollP, num_beds, f_bath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, 
newCompetition, vacCompetition. Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: 
house age, mls area, year, season and month sold.  
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Table B5 (continued). 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Regressors lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom lnsoldprR tom 
       
Tract Attributes       
blackP 0.0115 -6.030 0.00806 -6.475* 0.0153 -4.346 
 (0.019) (3.79) (0.019) (3.79) (0.020) (3.88) 
kidsP1 0.510*** -55.78* 0.254 -100.2*** 0.286* -90.27*** 
 (0.15) (30.9) (0.16) (32.3) (0.16) (32.6) 
kidsP2 -0.446*** -13.20 -0.364*** 0.328 -0.428*** -18.66 
 (0.094) (18.9) (0.096) (19.1) (0.10) (20.6) 
medHH99 0.00407*** -0.188*** 0.00386*** -0.214*** 0.00398*** -0.175*** 
 (0.00030) (0.061) (0.00030) (0.061) (0.00031) (0.063) 
enrollP -0.0232 -4.045 -0.0205 -3.637 -0.0151 -2.063 
 (0.026) (5.27) (0.026) (5.26) (0.026) (5.29) 
       
Neighborhood 
Market 
Conditions 
     
LD 0.00571***  0.00698***  0.00721***  
 (0.0020)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  
newLD -0.00650**  -0.0069***  -0.0069***  
 (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
vacLD -0.00506**  -0.00624**  -0.0065***  
 (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  
competition  0.103***  0.105***  0.106*** 
  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.0050) 
newCompetition  0.118***  0.117***  0.117*** 
  (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0056) 
vacCompetition  -0.102***  -0.104***  -0.105*** 
  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053) 
       
Constant 10.82*** 62.35* 10.82*** 83.62** 10.82*** 88.24** 
 (0.024) (35.8) (0.024) (36.0) (0.024) (36.1) 
Observations 6414 6414 6414 6414 6414 6414 
R-squared 0.86 0.55 0.86 0.55 0.86 0.55 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous variables: sps 
Improve, sps Worse, blackChange, freelunchChange, reassign, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, 
medHH99, enrollP, num_beds, f_bath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, 
newCompetition, vacCompetition. Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: 
house age, mls area, year, season and month sold.  
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Appendix C: Regression Results with School Performance Score as Independent Variable 
The empirical hedonic price function defined in Chapter III is as follows:  
inkttinkktinkt Z)Pln( εωΓδα ++++=    
Here, we estimate our model specification where Zkt elements are the year-specific school level 
attributes such as school performance score, percent black and percent receiving free lunch.  
Table 2C presents the coefficients on key variables.  
We find no capitalization of performance scores.  Again, we attribute this to many 
changes that EBRPSS has been through because of its battle with school desegregation law suits.  
As noted earlier, anecdotal evidence points to the fact that the boundaries, once drawn, were not 
meeting the requirements spelled in the Consent Decree and needed to be redrawn.  These 
developments can impact homebuyers’ expectations.  It is not surprising that test scores are not 
capitalized, in part, because homebuyers are uncertain about future policy changes.  In addition, 
there is a great deal of volatility in test scores and the way they are reported.  For example, the 
Louisiana Department of Education reported LEAP 21 and The Iowa Tests scores separately 
before the Louisiana School Accountability Program was established. As part of the 
accountability system, each school annually receives a School Performance Score (SPS), which 
indicates how well its students perform.  Specifically, each school’s effectiveness and progress 
are measured as a weighted composite index using results from state wide testing programs: 60 
percent weight for the LEAP 21 tests, 30 percent weight for the Iowa Tests, and 10 percent 
weight for the attendance and dropout index. School Performance Labels are assigned based on 
this score. Table C1 lists six performance categories. 
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Table C1.  2000-2001 School Performance Label Assignment 
School Performance Label                      SPS Range
School of Academic Excellence                150.0 or above
School of Academic Distinction                125.0 – 149.9
School of Academic Achievement             100.0 – 124.9
Academically Above the State Average     79.9 – 99.9
Academically Below the State Average     30.1 – 99.9
Academically Unacceptable School           30 or Below
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The distribution of the school performance labels gives an indication of a low performing school 
district.  For example, there are no schools of academic excellence in the district and only 1 
percent of this district’s elementary schools are Schools of Academic Distinction, while 57 
percent of the district elementary schools are labeled Academically Below the State Average. 
These numbers are calculated based on elementary schools. Schools with grades 9-12 and 9-12 
portions of K-12 schools (i.e., high school and combination schools) officially entered the 
Louisiana School Accountability System in the fall of 2001.  Also, The Louisiana Department of 
Education uses a two-year accountability cycle.  During each cycle, every school receives an 
SPS and a Growth SPS, which is calculated at the end of a cycle and is used to determine if a 
school has achieved its Growth Target.  All schools also receive an annual growth target and are 
expected to reach a score of 120 by the 2013-14 school year. The Louisiana Department of 
Education reports that the performance of EBR schools has improved since the implementation 
of this plan.  The average SPS for elementary schools in EBR increased five points from 1999 to 
2004. As suggested by Kane et al. (2003), in such environment, a school that is improving has a 
difficult time signaling that improvement to the buyers in the housing market.  Many schools in 
the EBRSS have been low performing schools, and we have reason to believe that buyers might 
be interested in trends in school quality. 
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Table C2. Regression Results Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ‘99$) 
 (1)Baseline Hedonic 
Level Values 
(2)Baseline Hedonic 
Level Values 
(3) Baseline Hedonic 
Categorical Rankings 
Regressors Neighborhood 
Controls from Census 
Tracts 
Neighborhood 
Controls from Local 
market Conditions  
Neighborhood 
Controls from Local 
market Conditions 
School Attributes    
School Performance 
Score 
0.000396 0.000340 0.000810*** 
 (0.00046) (0.00047) (0.00025) 
black_school 0.116*** 0.114***  
 (0.037) (0.037)  
freelunch_school -0.139** -0.145***  
 (0.055) (0.055)  
sps Improve    0.0553*** 
   (0.0072) 
sps Worse   -0.00374 
   (0.0094) 
blackChange   0.153** 
   (0.062) 
freelunchChange    0.0182 
   (0.073) 
reassign 0.0115** 0.0110* 0.0111** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Constant 10.81*** 10.83*** 10.76*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.034) 
Observations 6610 6610 6414 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are not 
reported for the following variables: Tract Attributes, House Attributes, house age, mls area, year 
and season sold. 
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Appendix D: Theoretical Model and Calibration Exercise 
To evaluate what happens when the houses in the market have different amenity levels 
such as school quality attached to them, we redefine the housing service flow to consist of an 
idiosyncratic component λ and an aggregate component x, 
xd += λ .     (1) 
The idiosyncratic component λ has the same interpretation as before.  The state 
variable x is aggregate in that all agents who live in houses receive exactly the same x.  
The variable x can reflect the aggregate state of the economy such as employment growth 
and interest rates.  Under this interpretation, shocks to the productivity of the land or to 
job growth filter their way into house prices through x.  A more concrete interpretation of 
x could include amenity levels such as school quality or the level of crime in the area.  
Under this interpretation, changes to a location-specific component in the housing service 
that reflects the value of land filters into house price through x.  By adding a random 
variable x to the housing service flow, the equations above that define equilibrium 
become functions of x. 
For simplicity, assume that x can take on just two values, low and high (L,H). The 
evolution of x is described by a Markov chain with the transition matrix 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−= αα
αα
1
1
M  
Additionally, let q be the expected value of having a house on the market and let 
µ(p) be the probability that a house will sell when the list price is p.  The seller chooses a 
price to solve 
( ) ( ){ }xEqpppxq p ′−+= βµµ ))(1()(max  for ., HL xxx =  (1) 
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The first part states that with probability µ the seller receives the asking price for the house.  The 
second part relates to the possibility of re-listing the house in the next period. The seller puts the 
house back on the market and tries to sell it again in the next period.  Here, the parameter β is a 
discount factor. 
The first order condition that gives the optimal price p is 
( ) ( ) 0)()( =+′− pxEqxp
dp
d µβµ  for ., HL xxx =   (2) 
The selling price of housing, p(x), and the expected value of having a house on the 
market, q(x), are determined in equations (1)–(2) in terms of µ, the probability of sale 
function.   
We now consider the optimal behavior for the agent in his role as buyer.  We start first 
with an agent who currently has a “match” and will consume the housing service flow  λ at the 
beginning of the next period.  After this period, the homeowner will continue to consume λ if the 
match persists for another period, an event that happens with probability π.  If, on the other hand, 
the match fails, the agent must put the house on the market and begin to search again, an event 
that happens with probability 1 – π.   Define v(λ,x) to be the lifetime expected utility of owning a 
house yielding service flow λ, then 
( ) ( ))))(1(),((),( xsxqxxEx ′+′−+′++′= πλπνλβλν    for ., HL xxx =     (3) 
The first and the second part of the equation state that an agent will consume housing 
service flow with certainty for the first period and with the probability of π for the second period.  
The third part relates to the house selling process, which we saw above, yields q in expected 
value.  The agent also has an option to search for a new house at this point.  The value of this 
search option is represented by s.   
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Under the optimal buy rule the agent buys the house with service flow λ for price p only 
if the expected value of the house net of price is greater than the option to search again next 
period.  That is, 
( ) ( )xEsxpx ′≥′− βλν ),(  for ., HL xxx =    (4) 
Since v is linear and strictly increasing in λ(x) there exists a λ*(x) such that a searching agent is 
indifferent between buying a house for the asking price p and searching again next period.  That 
is, there exists an λ* (x) such that  
( ) ( )xEsxpx ′=′− βλν *),( . for ., HL xxx =    (5) 
A buyer keeps searching if she draws λ< λ* and buys if she draws λ>λ*.  Therefore, we can 
write the expected value of search as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+= ∫1
*
))()(),())*(1()*(
π
λλνλβλ xpdFxxFxsxFxs  for ., HL xxx =  (6) 
Here, the probability of sale is simply the probability of drawing λ>λ*.  Given that F is the 
uniform distribution on [0,1] so that µ = 1 – F(λ*), or 
( ) ( )xx *1 λµ −=   for ., HL xxx =     (7) 
The equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium: an equilibrium in which each agent’s 
decision rules are best responses to the same decision rules when adopted by other agents.  The 
equilibrium is a price of housing p(x), an expectation of the value of a house on the market q(x), 
an expectation of the outcome from the search process s(x), a reservation service flow λ*(x), and 
a belief about the probability that a buyer will purchase a house µ(x) when the price is p for 
., HL xxx =   All these variables must satisfy equations (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7).  Given the 
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assumptions that there are two states of x, the model is solved by solving a system of 10 
equations and 10 unknowns. These equations can be solved numerically.    
 Two most important parameters in this model are the match persistence parameter or 
π, and the state persistence parameter α. Given these parameters Krainer (2002) shows that when 
buyer valuations are high, sellers raise their prices in response to the increased valuations of 
buyers.  It is also revealed that valuations of houses by potential buyers vary more across 
different states of the economy than do prices.  Thus, changes in underlying value of property are 
not fully reflected in transaction prices.  Rather, liquidity absorbs part of the capitalization of 
school quality.  
 Krainer (2002) performs a simple calibration exercise and looks at the differences across 
states between prices, valuations, and market liquidity.  In his exercise, the match persistence 
parameter, π, and the state persistence parameter, α, are both equal to 0.9968.  This value implies 
that expected time to match failure and expected time until a change in state variable x equal to 
six years.  Using these parameter values, the model predicts that prices in the high dividend state 
are 4.7 percent higher than in the low dividend state.  However, liquidity is shown to be affected 
much more than prices.  In particular, the probability of sale in any given week in a high 
dividend state is about 18 percent higher than in the low dividend state.   
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